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The chapters in this book were first presented as papers written for the 
November 2015 annual meeting of the Association for Public Policy and 
Management. The papers were revised based on the excellent comments from 
the session discussant, Burt Barnow. The revised papers also responded to 
questions and comments from the audience at the APPAM session. 
The most important contribution to this book comes from the authors, 
all of whom have worked on designing and evaluating workforce program 
experiments for many years. They share a common belief in the importance 
of using experimental methods to evaluate existing workforce programs and 









W.E. Upjohn Institute and Urban Institute
This book presents an analysis of the lessons learned from public
workforce experiments that have been conducted and evaluated in the 
United States. The U.S. Department of Labor (USDOL) has spon-
sored a large number of these experiments over several decades, and 
some of them have resulted in significant public workforce program 
and policy improvements. The USDOL has been a leader in making 
use of rigorous evaluations of existing workforce programs and in the 
development of new public workforce program options.1 
These experimental evaluations of public workforce programs 
have included evaluations of training programs—the Job Training 
Partnership Act (JTPA) and the Workforce Investment Act (WIA)—
and of the Job Corps. In the past, experimental evaluations have had 
an impact on public workforce policy. One example is an enormous 
cut in funding of the JTPA Youth program in 1995 following nega-
tive findings from the JTPA evaluation.2 A nother is the expansion 
of the Job Corps program at the beginning of the George W. Bush 
administration in response to a favorable evaluation of the program, 
despite an initial impulse to cut the program because of its high cost 
per participant.
Experimental methods have been widely used to develop new 
approaches to help dislocated workers return to work. One major 
effort was a series of unemployment insurance (UI) experiments that 
were conducted in the 1980s and 1990s to test new or improved reem-
ployment approaches. Two sets of experiments resulted in the enact-
ment of federal legislation in 1993: 1) a targeted, early-intervention 
job search assistance program known as Worker Profiling and Reem-
ployment Services and 2) a self-employment assistance program for 
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UI recipients called, simply, Self-Employment Assistance (Wandner 
2010). More recently, experimental evaluations of a UI work-search 
eligibility review and reemployment services program (Reemploy-
ment and Eligibility Assessment, or REA) has helped to increase 
funding for this program and encouraged the Obama administration 
to expand and restructure it as the recent Reemployment Services and 
Eligibility Assessment (RESEA) program.
The experimental evaluation of public workforce programs has 
been a major component of all U.S. experiments over the past 50 
years. For example, Greenberg, Shroder, and Onstott (2004) stud-
ied 293 social experiment interventions completed between 1962 
and 1996. They found that at least 186 of the interventions, or 63 
percent, could be categorized as public workforce experiments: job 
search assistance (33 interventions), work experience/on-the-job 
training (32), case management (32), counseling (23), wage subsidies 
(14), other employment services (13), job clubs (12), reemployment 
bonuses (10), job placement services (7), incentive bonuses to par-
ticipate in education/training (5), child care for employment (4), and 
employer tax credits (1).3 In the period since 1996, the number and 
diversity of social experiments has increased significantly, as has the 
percentage of experiments conducted outside the United States.4 
Interest in evidence-based policy increased during the Barack 
Obama administration, especially the use of rigorous research and 
evaluation methods and randomized controlled trials (RCTs). Early 
on, the White House reserved funding for experiments and had fed-
eral agencies compete for these funds. The White House also issued 
guidance regarding evidence-based public policy and rigorous evalu-
ations. More recently, the White House has encouraged small and 
large improvements in ongoing federal programs based on the results 
of low-cost experiments that used behavioral science methods. Spe-
cifically, in 2014 the Obama administration established the Social 
and Behavioral Sciences Team to build behavioral science findings 
into federal policy decision making. The cross-agency team was to 
be overseen by the White House Office of Science and Technology 
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Policy, with responsibility for translating findings and methods from 
the social and behavioral sciences into improvements to federal poli-
cies and programs. 
A number of federal agencies, including USDOL, have funded 
behavioral economics experiments. One ongoing USDOL-funded 
project, the Michigan Reemployment and Eligibility Assessment 
Experiment, is discussed below in separate chapters by Randall W. 
Eberts and Christopher J. O’Leary. The Michigan experiment has 
made small changes to program outreach that have succeeded in hav-
ing more unemployed workers participate in job search assistance 
programs. These types of incremental improvements to governmental 
programs are popularly known as “nudges,” based on a book of that 
title (Thaler and Sunstein 2009). 
Interest in improving governmental programs by learning from 
rigorous evaluations has in the past been bipartisan and widespread. 
In March 2016, Congress established the Commission on Evidence-
Based Policymaking, with cosponsorship from Speaker Paul Ryan 
(R-WI) and Senator Patti Murray (D-WA). The commission is chaired 
by Katharine G. Abraham of the University of Maryland and Ron 
Haskins of the Brookings Institution. The commission’s charge is to 
make recommendations about how administrative data can be made 
more accessible to researchers for policy evaluation purposes as well 
as to make recommendations on how rigorous evaluations can be 
made more integral to the ongoing operations of federal programs. 
A central task of the commission is the development of a plan for the 
establishment of an administrative data clearinghouse to support these 
program evaluation goals. The 15 commission members, appointed 
by the president, the House, and the Senate, have 15 months to issue 
a final report once membership is complete. 
This book consists of four chapters. Their principal authors—
Eberts, O’Leary, Irma Perez-Johnson, and Jacob Benus—have exten-
sive experience in designing, implementing, and evaluating a sub-
stantial number of USDOL experiments. Conducting experiments 
tends to be time consuming and expensive, and successfully imple-
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menting experiments is complicated. Because there was increasing 
interest in carrying out rigorous evaluations, the authors decided 
that presenting issues and lessons learned in the successful comple-
tion of these projects would be instructive to researchers and public 
policy analysts. Early versions of the chapters that make up this vol-
ume were presented at the November 2015 meeting of the Associa-
tion for Public Policy Analysis and Management, as indicated in the 
acknowledgments.
LESSONS LEARNED FROM PUBLIC 
WORKFORCE EXPERIMENTS
This book presents some key lessons learned from public work-
force RCTs, covering both the evaluations of existing programs and 
the development of new interventions. Among the topics covered are 
the following:
Securing Funding
The Department of Labor has concluded that programs should 
be rigorously evaluated on a regular basis, and it has considered 
establishing a periodic evaluation schedule, such as evaluating 
major programs every five years. Generally, however, there has been 
insufficient funding to achieve this target. The funding shortage has 
become more acute in recent years because of a decline in funding for 
public workforce research in the USDOL budget. Yet there has been 
increased concern that public policy be evidence based, suggesting 
the need for substantial increases in evaluation funding. 
Because of interest in using behavioral science research to 
improve programs, a number of federal agencies have provided 
funding for nudge projects. It is easier for the agencies to provide 
this funding since the cost of nudge RCTs tends to be much lower 
than that of other experiments, both because the interventions them-
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selves have minimal costs and because they tend to be evaluated with 
administrative data rather than with more costly participant surveys. 
Securing Participating States or Localities
State workforce agencies are primarily operational organizations 
for the delivery of public workforce services. State workforce agen-
cies and their local American Job Centers often do not see the need for 
or the direct benefit from research and evaluation of their operational 
effectiveness and efficiency. As a result, these research and evaluation 
activities frequently are met with limited enthusiasm and given low 
priority. Social experiments tend to be implemented in the small num-
ber of states that are most interested in learning how to improve their 
programs using rigorous evaluations. Indeed, Greenberg, Shroder, 
and Onstott (2004) find that, between 1962 and 1996, 54 percent of 
all experimental interventions were concentrated in nine states.5 
State participation in experiments can be voluntary or “recruited.” 
If the combination of participating states need not be representative 
of the country as a whole, then researchers can rely solely on volun-
teers. But if a representative sample of states is sought, then states 
have to be recruited so that they are representative geographically 
and demographically. For example, all of the UI experiments made 
use of state volunteers and ran competitions for some of the experi-
ments when there was an excess of expected volunteers. Similarly, 
for the Individual Training Account Experiment, USDOL solicited 
volunteer Workforce Investment Boards to participate. By contrast, 
the Job Corps and JTPA/WIA experimental evaluations were based 
on randomly assigned individuals or local offices, and each of these 
evaluations experienced participation problems.
States and local areas have traditionally had the option to partici-
pate or not in research and evaluation projects. Even though the major 
public workforce programs provide grants to states to operate, partici-
pating in these projects could be a condition of receiving grants. How-
ever, neither the Workforce Innovation and Opportunity Act (and its 
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predecessor statute, the Workforce Investment Act) nor the Wagner- 
Peyser Act requires participation in federally funded research and 
evaluation projects, although the Workforce Innovation and Oppor-
tunity Act encourages states to conduct their own research and evalu-
ations.6 By contrast, the Job Corps statute does require participation.
A similar problem involves the UI program. Section 303(a)(6) of 
the Social Security Act requires states to provide such reports as the 
secretary of labor may request, and these requests could include UI 
wage records that are used to assess the outcomes of many evalua-
tions. Nonetheless, it has often been difficult to obtain state UI wage 
records to estimate the impact of a program or an intervention. In 
2012, USDOL issued a UI program letter to try to assure that wage 
records would be made available by states in accordance with Section 
303(1)(6) (USDOL 2012). The Department of Labor has also worked 
around state objections to providing UI wage records for federal eval-
uation by using the National Directory of New Hires.
Monitoring Experiments
The training of state and local office staff as well as the close 
monitoring of the operation of experiments have been critical to 
maintaining the fidelity and integrity of an experiment’s design. It 
is easy for staff to stray from project procedures over time, and new 
staff must be trained over the life of the project.
It is helpful to have a number of monitors in the field. For the UI 
experiments, monitoring was conducted by the research contractor, 
USDOL staff, and state staff. The result of this three-level monitoring 
was the ability to maintain the integrity of the projects. For example, 
the Washington Self-Employment Assistance Experiment provided 
Self-Employment Assistance lump-sum payments averaging $4,225. 
State project monitors detected that a project staff member had 
approved payment to several project participants before the partici-
pants had met all of the criteria for payment, and the payments were 
not made. This was fortunate, because when the General Accounting 
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Office (as it was still called in the early 1990s) later conducted a 100 
percent audit of all 451 payments made by the project, they found that 
all payments were made in accordance with project procedures.
By contrast, for a state-funded Illinois Reemployment Bonus 
experiment, monitoring was minimal, and conditions changed during 
the operation of the project. It was only after the publication of the 
project evaluation report that the integrity of the project was called 
into question, resulting in federal reemployment bonus experiments 
to verify the Illinois evaluation results. 
Design, Implementation, and Evaluation Issues
There are a number of procedural issues discussed in this book, 
including whether or not an experiment will include a control group, 
random-assignment problems, and design considerations. The imple-
mentation and evaluation of experiments is a complex process. Green-
berg, Shroder, and Onstott (2004) report that until 1996 the concen-
tration of experience in conducting experiments in the United States 
resulted in a large percentage of the experiments being conducted by 
the so-called Big Three experimental evaluators: Mathematica Policy 
Research, Abt Associates, and Manpower Demonstration Research 
Corporation (MDRC). These three research and evaluation firms 
continue to be important, but expertise and experience have spread 
widely, and many other research institutions conduct and evaluate 
experiments, including IMPAQ International and the W.E. Upjohn 
Institute for Employment Research, both of which are represented 
among the authors of this book.
The design and evaluation process has a direct impact on the cost 
of experiments. The experiments discussed in this book vary in cost 
from under $100,000 (e.g., the Work First Experiment) to over $10 
million (e.g., the WIA Gold Standard Evaluation). The cost of experi-
ments is of critical importance in a world with stagnant or declin-
ing funding for research and evaluation. Future emphasis is likely 
to be placed on finding low-cost experiments, including nudge-type 
experiments. 
8   Wandner
Learning from and Using Results
Conducting experiments only makes a great deal of sense if they 
can influence public workforce programs and public policy. We will 
see in this book that experiments frequently have major impacts. 
For example, the JTPA evaluation resulted in temporary reductions 
in the JTPA Youth program while USDOL looked for better ways to 
administer youth employment programs. The initial REA evaluations 
resulted in restructuring and expanding funding for eligibility reviews 
and reemployment services. Demonstration projects can result in 
changing existing programs or creating new ones. Examples of the 
latter are the federal law creating the Worker Profiling and Reemploy-
ment Services program, based on a New Jersey UI experiment, and 
the Self-Employment Assistance program, based on the Massachu-
setts Self-Employment Assistance Experiment.
SUMMARY OF THE FOUR CHAPTERS
This book presents the design, policy, and administrative lessons 
learned from a series of experiments sponsored by the U.S. Depart-
ment of Labor. The experiments include the small and inexpensive 
Kalamazoo Work First Experiment, which offers lessons learned for 
developing future low-cost, effective public workforce experiments. 
A series of reemployment bonus experiments offer a new policy initia-
tive that has the potential to be cost effective if properly targeted. The 
Individual Training Account experiment helped to guide the design of 
training vouchers. Finally, the Nevada Reemployment and Eligibility 
Assessment Experiment, as well as two previous REA evaluations, 
have confirmed what has been learned from earlier experiments con-
ducted in New Jersey; the District of Columbia; Florida; and Charles-
ton, South Carolina; and this experiment reaffirms the need to provide 
reemployment services to UI recipients at the same time as conduct-
ing eligibility reviews. 
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Irma Perez-Johnson, Annalisa Mastri, and Samia Amin of 
Mathematica Policy Research draw on Mathematica’s experiences 
in designing and implementing demonstration studies for the U.S. 
Department of Labor to discuss how “on the ground” realities shape 
study design, implementation, and results. They recognize that when 
designing pilot programs, study teams are faced with the need to 
balance innovation with practicality, and analytical rigor with feasi-
bility. They draw on lessons from the Individual Training Account 
Experiment, the Self-Employment Training Demonstration, and the 
Workforce Investment Act Adult and Dislocated Worker Programs 
Gold Standard Evaluation, all conducted by Mathematica, to discuss 
the kinds of decisions and important issues that policymakers and 
researchers commonly negotiate, and how these can shape the design, 
implementation, and results of demonstration studies. 
Randall W. Eberts of the W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment 
Research writes about small, inexpensive experiments—both the 
recent effort to implement and use behavioral economics experiments 
to develop public policy, and an inexpensive Work First Experiment 
that demonstrates how low-cost public workforce experiments can be 
conducted. Reviewing the findings of the Work First Experiment, he 
discusses factors that can make local public workforce offices both 
more effective and more efficient in operating experiments. 
Jacob Benus of IMPAQ International writes about the impact of 
the Reemployment and Eligibility Assessment Initiative and three 
REA evaluations that include quasi-experimental and experimen-
tal designs. He describes a series of research projects conducted by 
IMPAQ in four states; the projects find evidence that the REA program 
is effective in reducing UI duration and in generating savings for the 
UI Trust Fund (Poe-Yamagata et al. 2011). Because the evaluation of 
the Nevada program generated substantially larger impacts than the 
evaluations of the other three states’ programs, the Nevada REA pro-
gram study was extended to see whether it would confirm the initial 
Nevada findings. The results (Michaelides et al. 2012) do indeed con-
firm the earlier results—the Nevada REA program was highly effec-
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tive in assisting claimants to exit the UI program sooner than they 
would have in the absence of the program. Based on these results, 
the study concluded that the combination of eligibility reviews and 
reemployment services is an effective model for reducing UI duration 
and assisting UI claimants in returning to productive employment.
Christopher J. O’Leary of the Upjohn Institute reviews the out-
comes of a wide variety of workforce program field experiments, 
conducted mostly for the U.S. Department of Labor. Specifically, he 
reviews the results of the following: reemployment bonus experi-
ments conducted in Illinois, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, and Wash-
ington; UI work test and job search assistance experiments conducted 
in Maryland, Washington, and Charleston, South Carolina; benefits 
rights interview experiments conducted in Massachusetts, Virginia, 
and Michigan; targeted job search assistance experiments conducted 
in New Jersey, the District of Columbia, Florida, and Kentucky; and 
employer incentive experiments conducted in Illinois, Washington, 
Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, Iowa, Oregon, and Dayton, Ohio. One 
of the studies he discusses is the Michigan Reemployment and Eligi-
bility Assessment Nudge experiment.
This book presents an overview of a large number of workforce 
RCT demonstrations and evaluations that have been conducted over 
the past 35 years. It describes what was done and how these experi-
ments have contributed to public policy, including the enactment of 
new legislation and the improvement of ongoing programs. It also 
presents the methods that have been used to ensure that these RCT 
studies are successful and that enable these studies to be conducted 
in a cost-effective manner. Taken together, the chapters of this book 
attempt to form a guide for conducting successful RCT studies in the 
future. 
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Notes
1. RCT experiments have been invaluable from a public-policy perspec-
tive in providing research and evaluations that are able to affect public
policy, but they also have limitations. See Rothstein and von Wachter
(forthcoming).
2. The decline in Youth grants to states was from $1.497 billion in 1994 to
$311 million in 1995.
3. Other categories of interventions included education, income transfers,
tax system, health, and electricity.
4. See David Greenberg and Mark Shroder’s periodic online publication,
Randomized Social Experiments eJournal, now in its ninth volume,
generally published weekly.
5. The states and the number of interventions tested in each state were as
follows: New York, 27; California, 26; Illinois, 19; Pennsylvania, 19;
Ohio, 16; Florida, 13; Massachusetts, 13; Texas, 13; and Washington, 13.
6. Workforce Innovation and Opportunity Act, Section 169.
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Realities Shape the Design, 






Planning and implementing a large-scale experimental evaluation
of a social program is not unlike planning and embarking on a major 
road trip. Before leaving, we carefully plot the route, identify likely 
stopping points, book needed accommodations, and even check for 
road construction and other potential obstacles along the way. Simi-
larly, a significant amount of effort is invested up front in the design 
and planning for the launch of an experimental study. One specifies 
the intervention’s theory of change or logic model, identifies the 
outcomes of interest, determines necessary sample sizes, specifies 
random-assignment procedures, identifies the data sources and ana-
lytic methods that will be used to evaluate results, recruits study sites, 
and generally tries to plan for all the needed details and anticipate as 
many roadblocks as possible.
Despite all this planning, the one certainty in both major road 
trips and experimental studies is that one will encounter unanticipated 
challenges and will have to adapt quickly. Evaluators need to bal-
ance the ideal with the practical while maintaining analytical rigor. 
For instance, when conducting a study of a program being imple-
mented in multiple sites, often the ideal would be for all study sites 
to offer identical services to clients, delivered by staff with similar 
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backgrounds and training, and with the same level of resources. But 
this is rarely feasible.
This chapter draws on our experiences designing and implement-
ing three experimental studies of social programs to discuss how 
“on the ground” realities can shape the design, implementation, and 
results of such studies. We first provide some background on each 
study, then discuss considerations for designing, executing, and inter-
preting the results of such studies. We conclude with a summary of 
lessons that can inform similar efforts moving forward.
THREE ILLUSTRATIVE EXPERIMENTAL STUDIES
We draw on our experiences from three large-scale experimen-
tal studies sponsored by the U.S. Department of Labor (USDOL): 
1) the Individual Training Account Experiment (ITA Experiment),
2) the Workforce Investment Act Adult and Dislocated Worker Pro-
grams Gold Standard Evaluation (WIA Evaluation), and 3) the Self-
Employment Training Demonstration (SET Demonstration). The
ITA Experiment and the WIA Evaluation were conducted within the
context of ongoing programs under the Workforce Investment Act
of 1998 (WIA). The SET Demonstration project was designed to
show proof-of-concept—that is, to test whether a new program could
be implemented with fidelity to the model and achieve the desired
effects. Although all three studies took place in workforce-related set-
tings with individual job seekers, many of the lessons learned from
these experiments can be applied more broadly to experimental stud-
ies of human services programs.
The Individual Training Account Experiment
The ITA Experiment examined the effectiveness of three alterna-
tive models of delivering WIA-funded training vouchers, known as 
ITAs. Although WIA directed states to restrict available training pro-
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grams for local high-demand occupations, it also gave states consid-
erable flexibility in structuring their ITAs. For example, states could 
vary the amount of money they offered to trainees, the counseling 
supports offered, and the amount of counseling they required train-
ees to complete before getting access to an ITA (Perez-Johnson et al. 
2000). 
The ITA Experiment sought to determine the optimal combina-
tions of training dollars and counseling supports by testing the fol-
lowing three approaches: 
1) Guided choice. This option featured fixed-amount and mod-
erately sized ITAs ($3,500 on average) and some manda-
tory counseling activities to guide trainees’ program choices.
Guided choice was designed to resemble the widespread
practice used in the early 2000s, when the study was launched 
(Trutko and Barnow 1999).
2) Structured choice. In this option, trainees could receive cus-
tomized ITAs with a higher cap (around $7,500) but were
required to complete more intensive counseling, and case-
workers could veto training choices on which they expected
to have low labor-market returns.
3) Maximum choice. In this option, customers received the
same ITA amount as under guided choice. Counseling to dis-
cuss training options, although available, was not required.
Trainees had to request counseling if they wanted it.
The experiment took place in eight Local Workforce Investment 
Areas (LWIAs) across the United States. A total of 7,920 participants 
were randomly assigned to one of the three ITA approaches (Perez-
Johnson et al. 2004). Staff in each LWIA worked with customers in 
all three study groups to avoid staff-specific effects on participants’ 
outcomes, and all participants in each study site had the same menu of 
training programs to choose from. The experiment compared partici-
pants’ training and earnings outcomes for up to seven years after entry 
into the study (Perez-Johnson, Moore, and Santillano 2011).
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The WIA Adult and Dislocated Worker Programs Gold 
Standard Evaluation
The WIA Evaluation (Mastri et al. 2015) aimed to estimate the 
relative effectiveness of three tiers of services offered through the 
WIA Adult and Dislocated Worker Programs:
1) Core services. Available to all customers, core services
typically include self-service activities such as accessing
job listings and local labor market information in a resource
room or on the Internet.
2) Core and intensive services. Customers who are unable to
get a job that would lead to self-sufficiency using core ser-
vices alone may access intensive services. These services
can include customers working with a counselor to develop
an employment plan and obtain in-depth assessments of
their skills, interests, and abilities.
3) The full WIA offering (core + intensive + training). Cus-
tomers who need a skills upgrade to obtain or retain employ-
ment can request ITAs to fund training from approved
providers.
The WIA Evaluation was designed to produce nationally rep-
resentative impacts. Therefore, the study first randomly selected 
LWIAs nationwide and then convinced them to participate in the 
study. In these LWIAs, almost all customers who requested and were 
eligible for WIA intensive services or training and who consented to 
participate in the study were randomly assigned to one of the three 
groups described above. Study intake occurred between November 
2011 and February 2013, with intake durations varying between 2 and 
16 months across the participating LWIAs. Across the 28 LWIAs that 
participated in the study, 35,665 customers were randomly assigned 
to one of the three groups. The evaluation examined the service 
receipt and labor market outcomes of study participants measured at 
15 months and 30 months after their enrollment in the study.
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The Self-Employment Training Demonstration
The ongoing SET Demonstration is testing strategies to support 
dislocated workers who want to start their own businesses (Amin et 
al. 2016). Unemployed and underemployed workers who propose 
establishing businesses in their fields of expertise are eligible for the 
program. Eligible applicants are randomly assigned either to a treat-
ment group that gets access to SET services, in addition to whatever 
other services are available in the local area, or to a control group, 
which cannot access the SET program but can seek out the other 
services available in the area. The treatment group participants can 
receive up to 12 months of counseling, training, and technical assis-
tance on business development from experienced providers, as well 
as up to $1,000 in seed capital microgrants to help them establish 
their businesses. As noted, the SET Demonstration was designed to 
illustrate proof-of-concept of a new program rather than evaluate 
existing services. Thus, the SET program itself had to first be devel-
oped alongside the evaluation, then sites selected to implement it. The 
program is being tested in four metropolitan areas across the United 
States (Chicago; Cleveland; Los Angeles; and Portland, Oregon). 
Enrollment occurred between July 2013 and February 2016, yielding 
a sample of 1,981 study participants. The evaluation will use survey 
data to measure SET’s impact on receipt of self-employment assis-
tance services, self-employment experiences, employment and earn-
ings (both from self-employment and from wage/salary jobs), and 
job satisfaction. It is also drawing on qualitative data from site visits, 
phone interviews, and a management information system to examine 
program implementation. 
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HOW ON-THE-GROUND REALITIES SHAPE THE 
DESIGN, IMPLEMENTATION, AND RESULTS OF 
EXPERIMENTAL STUDIES
With the key features of these studies in mind, we now discuss 
how real-world factors frequently affect the design, implementa-
tion, and interpretation of results of experimental studies. The design 
phase encompasses everything from specifying the research ques-
tions of interest to conducting power calculations and identifying and 
recruiting sites that are suitable for the evaluation. The implementa-
tion phase includes a period of training for participating sites in study 
procedures, the study intake period, and the period of data collection 
and analysis. The results phase focuses on interpreting the study’s 
results in light of the design and implementation experiences. Finally, 
we discuss special considerations for demonstration programs such 
as SET.
Study Design
The first phase in which on-the-ground realities begin to shape 
the experimental study is during the study’s design phase. Key con-
siderations include the following:
Selecting policy-relevant treatment contrasts
The study will have the most potential to detect program impacts 
if it can compare program receipt with the absence of similar services 
(i.e., a no-treatment control condition) or compare treatments that dif-
fer notably along key dimensions (i.e., contrasting important alterna-
tive approaches). A no-treatment counterfactual may be infeasible for 
an experimental study in the case of mandated or entitlement pro-
grams that do not allow denial of services to eligible individuals. In 
these cases, an experimental design could involve randomly assign-
ing additional program components on top of entitled services, but it 
could not deny entitled services to form a control group. For instance, 
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WIA mandates universal access to core services. Therefore, the WIA 
Evaluation had to be designed so that all study participants could re-
ceive core services, and the study randomly assigned those who could 
receive intensive counseling and training services on top of core ser-
vices. This made it impossible for the study to determine the overall 
effectiveness of WIA relative to no access to any WIA service.
Depending on the study’s goals, comparing alternative approaches 
may be the preferred design even if a no-treatment contrast is fea-
sible. For instance, in the ITA Experiment, the goal was to determine 
the optimal approach to structure ITAs, rather than to assess the net 
impacts of ITA training. In that case, it did not make sense to have 
a control group with no access to ITAs. For the WIA Experiment, 
the treatment-control contrasts would have been greater if study par-
ticipants didn’t have access to Wagner-Peyser Act employment ser-
vices, which in some LWIAs are very similar to intensive services. 
But restricting study participants’ access to Wagner-Peyser services 
would have represented a counterfactual that does not exist in reality, 
making the study’s results less policy relevant. Similarly, in the SET 
study, the objective was to learn whether having the opportunity to 
participate in SET would result in better outcomes than having access 
to the usual infrastructure for business development support. In this 
scenario, it did not make sense, nor was it feasible, to ask partner 
providers or others to refuse their usual services to members of the 
SET control group.
Researchers and the policymakers interested in the studies’ results 
must recognize in advance the potential limitations of the study find-
ings. For example, in the ITA Experiment, a finding of no differences 
between the study groups would not imply that training was ineffec-
tive, just that the various voucher approaches did not change customer 
outcomes. Similarly, the SET study can show whether enhanced self-
employment services matter, but not whether self-employment ser-
vices in general are effective. Null findings from alternative treatment 
contrasts must be interpreted carefully, and a no-service control group 
can typically answer a broader set of policy-relevant questions.
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Matching data collection plans with desired indicators
Ideally, the outcomes of interest to the study align well with the 
anticipated effects of the intervention being tested and are already 
captured in administrative data sources. However, these conditions 
frequently do not hold. For instance, in the SET Demonstration, the 
intervention was expected to affect self-employment activities and 
success rates of new businesses started by study participants. But data 
on these key outcomes of interest are not currently contained in ad-
ministrative databases. Self-employment activities are not reportable 
to the state unemployment insurance reporting system, which is the 
typical source of administrative data on people’s earnings. Thus, the 
study team decided early on that a survey of study participants would 
be necessary to collect key outcomes.
Collecting information on the treatment group’s service receipt 
is important for interpreting the study’s results. However, programs’ 
management information systems do not always collect service receipt 
data at the level of detail ideal for the study. Moreover, it is rarely the 
case that these systems collect data on services that treatment-group 
members receive outside the program or on any services that control-
group members receive. In addition, program staff often differ in the 
extent to which they update administrative systems with such infor-
mation. For the SET Demonstration, participants’ service receipt and 
achievement of program milestones were critical components of illus-
trating proof-of-concept. Therefore, the study team offered service 
providers financial incentives to record information on participants’ 
progress through SET in a study-designed tracking system. 
Finally, collecting information on control group members’ ser-
vice receipt is often important in understanding the counterfactual 
condition and interpreting the study’s results. This is especially true 
in service-rich environments, where control-group members might be 
receiving services that are very similar to those of treatment-group 
members. This was the case in the SET study, and surveys are usually 
the best source of these data.
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To be sure, there are some instances where the context in which 
the program operates facilitates use of existing data sources. For 
instance, a program implemented in a workforce system setting among 
a segment of job-seeking customers might be able to use administra-
tive data the workforce system is already collecting on all customers 
to examine the employment outcomes of participants. Care must be 
taken in the design phase, however, to assess not only the feasibility 
of using existing administrative data sources but also the quality of 
these data, and to develop a backup plan if appropriate.
Short-listing good candidates for the study
Not all sites are good candidates for inclusion in an experimental 
study. Some are in the midst of making big changes to their program-
ming or organizational structures. Others may be reluctant to partici-
pate in an experimental study, or are already participating in a differ-
ent study. And some sites will simply lack the client flow necessary 
for participating in a study. 
For the WIA Evaluation, we began with a list of the full set of 
LWIAs nationwide. Given the evaluation’s target sample sizes and 
intake period, we excluded LWIAs serving fewer than 100 custom-
ers per year. Not having adequate client flow can be even more of 
an issue for experimental studies of grant programs that might only 
award enough funds to serve a relatively small number of customers 
in each site, meaning that many sites would need to participate in the 
study in order to detect meaningful impacts. In some cases, there sim-
ply might not be enough total participants over the study’s time frame 
to support an experimental study.
Recruiting enough suitable sites to participate in the study
Having an adequate number of sites participating in the study is 
critical for being able to detect meaningful program impacts. How-
ever, recruiting sites is rarely a straightforward process, even when 
there are a number of potentially suitable sites for the evaluation. For 
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the ITA Experiment, USDOL issued a request for proposals to inter-
ested LWIAs or consortia of agencies, and only six expressed interest 
in implementing the experiment, despite generous financial incen-
tives to do so. For the SET Demonstration, the study team preselected 
six metropolitan areas in six states that met the necessary conditions 
for the study and conducted targeted outreach to them. LWIAs in one 
metropolitan area were keen to participate but did not have sufficient 
provider capacity to implement the model as planned. LWIAs in an-
other metropolitan area did not want to participate because of con-
cerns about staff burden.
The WIA Evaluation faced an additional challenge. To be nation-
ally representative, the study needed to first randomly select LWIAs 
nationwide and then convince them to participate in the study. We 
aimed to include 30 LWIAs in the study and successfully recruited 26 
(87 percent) of these. In addition, we recruited two others that were 
randomly selected to replace two of the four local areas that declined 
to participate, for a total of 28 local areas participating in the study. 
For all three studies, our recruitment efforts succeeded because 
we did the following:
We involved all key stakeholders in recruitment presentations 
and meetings. Having all interested parties at the table is important 
for achieving buy-in. For the WIA Evaluation, we first had to identify 
who the relevant stakeholders were in each LWIA. In some, the LWIA 
could not agree to participate without support from the state, so state 
representatives were involved. Some potential sites asked us to pres-
ent in front of their local boards. Others asked us to meet with line 
staff or staff from partner organizations or referral sources. For SET, 
we conducted a series of recruitment e-mails and calls—first with re-
gional and state officials from both the UI office and the workforce 
development departments. We followed up these initial contacts with 
meetings with the local workforce agencies. We wrapped up with in-
person visits to each of the promising sites. 
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We demonstrated that we had the strong commitment and 
support of USDOL. For the WIA evaluation, federal USDOL staff 
participated in recruiting trips, the assistant secretary of labor sent 
letters to LWIAs and also made phone calls to some of the more re-
luctant sites, and USDOL staff held a special session at a conference 
attended by LWIA representatives to discuss the importance of the 
study. For SET, senior USDOL staff wrote e-mails to invite participa-
tion and participated in site recruitment calls.
We offered compensation. The WIA, ITA, and SET studies all 
provided sites with payments to offset the staff time associated with 
implementing study procedures and cooperating with evaluation ac-
tivities. These payments could be used, for example, to hire an addi-
tional staff person to assist with data entry or documentation needed 
for the study (e.g., assembling and securely storing study forms), or to 
hire an additional staff person to handle the added caseload. 
We offered concessions to make the experiment more attrac-
tive to sites. The design phase is a good time to start thinking through 
parts of the experiment that might be contentious from the standpoint 
of the sites. Even when sites are mandated to participate in an ex-
periment (for instance, as a condition of receiving grant funding), re-
searchers want to ensure their buy-in for the study so that they maxi-
mize the study’s potential success. Common sticking points include 
the following three:
1) Denying services to customers in the control group(s).
Program staff are motivated by a desire to help their cus-
tomers and often find the idea of denying services unpalat-
able. They also might be reluctant to deny services because
it could result in unused capacity at their programs. A
potential solution to both problems is to reduce the ratio
of participants that are denied services. Although having
equally sized treatment and control groups is optimal from
a statistical power standpoint, sites may be more comfort-
24   Perez-Johnson, Mastri, and Amin
able with randomization if a smaller proportion of partici-
pants are turned away. For the WIA Evaluation, we deter-
mined the total sample size needs with an average random- 
assignment rate of around 6 percent each to the core and 
core-and-intensive groups. The other 88 percent of custom-
ers were randomly assigned to the group that could receive 
full WIA services as usual. However, these study group 
assignment rates were possible because of the large study 
sample size. 
2) Implementing burdensome study procedures. If sites
perceive that they will have to engage in burdensome
documentation or other study procedures, they will be less
likely to cooperate. During the design phase, steps can be
taken to reduce the study’s burden on participating sites.
For instance, for the SET Demonstration, we developed an
online orientation video and online participant application
to save American Job Center staff from conducting these
in person. The study team also planned to review appli-
cations, make eligibility determinations, conduct random
assignment, and refer individuals accepted into SET to the
local microenterprise providers who provided services. For
the WIA Evaluation, staff at American Job Centers had to
conduct the random assignment, so we developed an easy-
to-use online random-assignment system that would only
require staff to enter minimal information as data.
3) Concern about the effects on the program’s performance.
Program administrators may worry about how the study
will affect the extent to which they meet or exceed legis-
latively mandated performance targets. Depending on the
study design, this could occur because the programs will be
serving fewer total customers (since some will be assigned
to the control group) or because some of the particularly
promising customers—who would have contributed favor-
ably to the program’s performance reporting—will be
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assigned to the control group and hence not be included 
in the reporting. In the case of demonstration programs, 
desired outcomes for the new project might not align with 
the existing performance measures. Efforts can be made to 
see whether program offices can relax or adapt performance 
requirements for the duration of the study.
Implementing the Study
Often, we can anticipate during the design phase many of the 
challenges of implementing a social experiment in the context that 
we are studying, and we begin adapting the study design at that point. 
But ultimately the success of the evaluation hinges on how well the 
evaluation team adapts and responds to challenges encountered dur-
ing the evaluation’s implementation. Key challenges we frequently 
have faced and to which we have had to adapt include the following:
Achieving buy-in of program staff 
Even after sites have agreed to participate in a study—a deci-
sion that is often made at the administrative or higher level—frontline 
staff working directly with participants might still not understand the 
value of an experimental study. It is particularly of concern when the 
control group will not have access to study services and cannot find 
alternative services in the community. Sometimes program staff have 
such dedication to serving their clients that they are resistant to par-
ticipating in the study or following study procedures.
Explaining the importance of the study in easy-to-understand 
terms is critical to achieving staff buy-in. For the WIA Evaluation, 
we developed a presentation and accompanying one-page fact sheet 
aimed at line staff and supervisors. We delivered the presentation dur-
ing site recruitment visits and distributed the fact sheets throughout 
the course of the evaluation. Both described the study’s importance, 
goals, and basic outlines of the design in layman’s terms. In particu-
lar, they centered on why random assignment is the strongest research 
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design, why it is ethical, and how the study’s results would be used to 
make future funding decisions, allowing program staff to continue or 
even expand their good work. 
Building capacity of program staff to implement study pro-
cedures correctly
Program staff are typically not accustomed to explaining a re-
search study to potential participants, obtaining their consent to par-
ticipate, entering information into a tracking or random-assignment 
system, conducting random assignment, and informing study partici-
pants of their study-group assignments. Yet successfully implement-
ing each of these steps is critical to the success of the experimental 
study.
To address these challenges for the WIA Evaluation, the study 
team thoroughly investigated the program service delivery structure, 
customer flow, and staffing, and developed study procedures custom-
ized for each site in order to be as seamless as possible with existing 
service delivery. The study team developed customized study proce-
dure manuals documenting in detail each step that program staff had 
to take for the study. The manuals included explanations of the study 
forms, scripts for explaining the study to customers and collecting 
their consent, and detailed information on how to use the random-
assignment system. Information was presented in multiple ways—for 
instance, as scripts and as talking points that staff could adapt to their 
own style. We conducted a day-long training at each site for staff to go 
over the study procedures in detail and to allow staff the opportunity to 
practice role playing. Early training sessions revealed that, in our zeal-
ousness to provide sites with lots of details and many options for con-
veying information to study participants, some staff felt overwhelmed 
by the volume of information provided. So we developed a reference 
guide that boiled down the study procedures manual into a 10-page 
document that staff could more easily reference on a daily basis.
The SET Demonstration took a different approach. The study 
team limited LWIA responsibilities to referring potential clients to 
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the SET website so they didn’t have to deal with complex study pro-
cedures. As described above, the study team handled orientations, 
applications, random assignment, and client referral to services. 
Nonetheless, since only one out of our four sites was familiar with 
self-employment services, we still had to build LWIA capacity for 
promoting this new kind of program. To do so, we provided detailed 
procedure manuals, in-person training, scripts for describing the SET 
program, and attractive brochures and fliers to help promote SET. 
We learned over time, however, that just simplifying the pro-
cedures and initial training was not sufficient. One unintended side 
effect of not involving LWIA staff in orientations and intake for SET 
was that they were less familiar with the program and less invested in 
its success. Capacity building therefore became an ongoing effort. We 
discuss below how we created feedback loops to address this issue. 
Reserving resources to maintain buy-in and capacity for the 
evaluation 
Commitment, energy, and attention to the evaluation may wane 
over the course of implementation. Initially, sites may be excited 
about what they can learn through participation, or—in the case of 
demonstration projects—about the prospect of offering new services 
to their customers. However, it takes enduring commitment on the 
part of program administrators and staff to follow through on that 
initial excitement. This is especially true in times when site partners 
are under strain—when resources run low, staff turnover is high, or 
staff face many competing responsibilities. In those circumstances, it 
can be asking a lot for sites and their staff to maintain their commit-
ment and attention to a temporary initiative. It can be especially chal-
lenging in the case of demonstration projects in which a whole new 
program must be tested (see Box 2.1).
Supporting program staff to correctly implement study proce-
dures cannot end with training. Study teams must devote resources to 
providing ample support throughout the study enrollment period and 
extra technical assistance when support and effort appear to be wan-
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Box 2.1  Special Considerations for Demonstration Projects: 
Ensuring Program Fidelity
The goal of a demonstration project is twofold: first, to provide 
“proof of concept” (i.e., a demonstration that a program can be suc-
cessfully implemented while being faithful to the model) and, second, 
to evaluate the impacts of the program. Project staff must be prepared 
for the reality that it can take time to implement the demonstration pro-
gram with fidelity. Program staff often struggle to deliver a new set of 
services as planned, especially when they are quite different from what 
they are used to delivering. This can result in delays in beginning to 
offer services in the first place, and in weak program implementation. 
In some cases, monitoring to identify implementation difficulties 
and providing ongoing support to the sites can rectify these issues. 
For instance, early in the SET Demonstration, the study team noticed 
through visits to the SET service providers that case management ser-
vices—a critical element of the program—were not being delivered as 
frequently or thoroughly as intended. The study team provided techni-
cal assistance on the case management model to 5 of the 11 service 
providers over three to eight months. The study team also initiated 
monthly phone calls to monitor implementation fidelity and provide 
an opportunity for SET service providers to ask questions of the evalu-
ation team.
In other cases, the demonstration (or some aspect of it) proves 
difficult to implement because it is too much of a departure from stan-
dard practice. For instance, the Structured Choice approach in the 
ITA Experiment was not fully implemented because counselors felt 
uncomfortable vetoing customers’ training choices. The study authors 
concluded that a substantial cultural shift would need to take place 
for program staff to successfully implement the Structured Choice 
approach (as originally envisioned) to administering ITAs. Notably, 
despite the more limited implementation of the Structured Choice 
approach in the ITA Experiment, it proved the most effective of the 
three ITA approaches tested (Perez-Johnson, Moore, and Santillano 
2011). 
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ing. Training must be followed by monitoring phone calls with pro-
gram staff and, if possible, site visits to understand the implementa-
tion challenges and determine how best to address them. These issues 
could range from the relatively insignificant, such as assembling 
forms in the wrong order, to the significant, such as not randomly 
assigning everyone who is eligible for the study. Designating a person 
from the evaluation team to serve as a liaison with each site can be 
an effective way to monitor implementation and handle questions or 
concerns from program staff; all three of our studies provided this. In 
addition, both the WIA Evaluation and the SET Demonstration oper-
ated hotlines for staff to call with questions.
For the SET Demonstration, the study team realized that, because 
SET was a new and temporary program (available for less than three 
years) and not directly provided by LWIA staff, workforce staff were 
promoting it less and less over time than they had at the beginning of 
operations. Moreover, budget pressures in the participating LWIAs 
were making it difficult for overburdened workforce and UI staff to 
focus on SET. The team introduced feedback loops to get the buy-in 
of the referral sources in the LWIAs. We sent monthly e-mail updates 
to all LWIAs on the progress of their recruitment efforts relative to 
other sites. This encouraged sites that were recruiting well to keep up 
the good work and motivated some of our lagging sites to become 
more competitive. For sites where recruitment was lagging, we con-
ducted in-person visits to retrain and motivate staff and followed that 
up with biweekly calls. Sharing client success stories and testimonials 
proved to be a particularly effective strategy but was only feasible 
once the program had been in operation for a while. It helped to gen-
erate excitement about SET and made staff more comfortable in refer-
ring clients to the new program. 
Increasing assistance when staff burden exceeds expectations
Except in rare cases, some interruptions to the ideal flow of ser-
vices that staff provide and participants receive should be expected. 
Staff members, in addition to their regular duties, must perform study 
30   Perez-Johnson, Mastri, and Amin
procedures and, in many cases, some data entry in support of the 
study. During the study implementation phase, they might find that 
implementing study procedures is taking longer than the evaluation 
team had anticipated, imposing unexpected burdens on program staff 
and causing errors in following study procedures.
One way to address any unanticipated burden is to offer addi-
tional compensation or other resources to local partners. For the SET 
Demonstration, for example, we provided additional funds to support 
special outreach activities such as mailings in sites where meeting 
recruiting targets required additional effort. For all of our sites, we 
provided additional supplies of publicity materials (fliers, brochures) 
whenever they were needed because these were expensive for our 
partner sites to produce. We also provided ongoing support by des-
ignating evaluation liaisons to each study site to help troubleshoot 
emerging challenges.
Developing new tools to minimize the burden on staff can also 
help. During the WIA Evaluation, some sites noted that introducing 
and explaining the evaluation was taking them substantially longer 
than anticipated. As a result, the evaluation team developed a video—
much like the one used in the SET Demonstration—that staff could 
play for customers either at their desks or in a group orientation set-
ting. This freed up staff to work on other tasks while the video played. 
Another example was adding study group assignment to exist-
ing program management information systems. Because program 
staff conducted random assignment for the study, they had to enter 
some information about customers into an online random-assignment 
system we had designed for the study, and customers’ study group 
assignments were recorded there. Although we had designed the sys-
tem so that minimal data entry was required, some staff complained 
that they had to look up every customer with whom they met in the 
online system to see whether they were already enrolled in the evalu-
ation and, if so, what services they were allowed to receive. They 
noted that it would be easier to look up this information in their exist-
ing management information systems, which they would be accessing 
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anyway when working with customers. As a result, the evaluation 
team worked with data systems personnel at the state level to add 
fields with which to document study groups within the existing state-
wide management information system. 
Documenting variations in service delivery across participat-
ing sites
Differences in staff backgrounds and training, program context, 
participant characteristics, and the way service providers are accus-
tomed to delivering services mean that services that are nominally the 
same may not actually be delivered in exactly the same way across 
sites. For instance, WIA gives local areas considerable discretion in 
service delivery. We found that during the WIA Evaluation a core “job 
search workshop” varied in length from a couple of hours at one site 
to three days at another. It also was categorized as an intensive service 
at some sites but a core service at others. 
In the ITA Experiment, the goal was for participating sites to 
implement the same three ITA approaches. However, ITA caps had 
varied across sites before the study, and sites needed to set the caps 
high enough that they would spend their entire training budget (or 
lose it the next year). As a result, the caps for each treatment arm 
necessarily varied across sites. Other variations included which occu-
pations were considered high wage and high demand, whether assess-
ments were required and used as a counseling tool, and supervisor 
involvement in the approval of customer training selections under the 
Structured Choice approach. 
The SET Demonstration was designed to provide a common ser-
vice flow across microenterprise service delivery providers, includ-
ing individualized service planning, monthly check-ins, quarterly 
reassessments and service plan updates, and the $1,000 seed capital 
microgrant available to participants who met required milestones. 
Within these parameters, however, sites varied in how they structured 
their check-ins, the degree to which they relied on workshops and 
group classes, and the range of technical assistance and additional 
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services they offered to SET participants. The infrastructure for self-
employment support—e.g., the number or reach of individual provid-
ers and the overall culture of entrepreneurship—also varied across 
sites.
Documenting these variations is important for interpreting the 
findings of the impact analysis and providing lessons learned for 
program improvement. Large experimental evaluations often have 
an implementation study tied to them—particularly in the case of 
demonstration projects—in which qualitative researchers systemati-
cally collect information on many aspects of program organization, 
operations, and staffing, among other topics. This can be a rich source 
of information on variation in program delivery across participating 
study sites. Lower-cost methods such as phone calls with sites and 
online staff surveys can also be good sources of this information. 
Addressing changes in service delivery in response to the study
Studies of ongoing programs would ideally examine the effec-
tiveness of services as they are typically delivered. However, some-
times a service offering or its delivery changes in unexpected ways 
as a result of the study. In the ITA Experiment, some private train-
ing vendors appeared to change the content and price of their offer-
ings in response to the study, bundling additional certificates together 
and charging a higher price because the ITA cap was higher for some 
customers as a result of the experiment. During the WIA Evaluation, 
staff in some local areas reported that referral sources such as local 
community colleges were “drying up” because of a misperception 
that the local area was no longer funding ITAs. And in evaluations 
where study enrollment is lower than anticipated, assigning a fraction 
of study participants to a control group may leave some slots unfilled. 
As a result, staff may find that they have more resources to serve any 
given customer, thereby allowing them to deliver more intensive ser-
vices than they would in the absence of the study. 
The study team must pay attention to these issues for the duration 
of the study enrollment and follow-up period and address any sub-
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stantial changes in service delivery to the extent possible. Failure to 
do so could have significant implications, particularly if the program 
is so changed that it no longer provides an accurate picture of how 
the program will operate once the study is over. In other words, the 
evaluation is of a program that does not exist. In the case of the ITA 
Experiment, little could be done to change service provider prices or 
restrict participants from asking for ITA funds up to the cap available 
to them. For the WIA Evaluation, the study team worked with man-
agers and administrators at the LWIA to coordinate outreach to their 
referral sources to explain the study and emphasize that training funds 
were still available. 
Monitoring sample sizes and adjusting procedures accordingly
Recruitment often lags behind what was anticipated based on pre-
vious history or projected customer flow. If sample sizes substantially 
lag behind projections, the study will be less able to detect meaning-
ful program impacts. Based on historical data on the number of cus-
tomers served in participating LWIAs, the WIA Evaluation expected 
to enroll about 85,000 customers in the study. In actuality, only about 
36,000 were enrolled. In the SET Demonstration, enrollment lagged 
substantially below targets, partly because the eligibility require-
ments were fairly narrow and partly because the high unemployment 
levels that prompted the demonstration in the first place had abated by 
the time the program began. In the ITA Experiment, the opposite hap-
pened—the economic downturn that occurred around the time of the 
study, which was unanticipated, increased the overall flow of custom-
ers and trainees through the participating LWIAs, resulting in much 
larger sample sizes over the study’s two-year implementation period.
It is imperative that researchers monitor sample buildup and 
work with sites to understand and rectify, to the extent possible, prob-
lems with recruiting enough participants. The SET Demonstration 
revised outreach materials to make them simpler and more acces-
sible to potential participants. They worked on achieving buy-in from 
LWIA staff so that they would spread the word and promote the dem-
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onstration program. They also tailored outreach tactics for each site, 
including boosting advertising efforts in some sites and even hiring a 
marketing firm for outreach in one site.
The WIA Evaluation encouraged program staff to tap their refer-
ral sources, but the main approach to combating lower-than-expected 
sample sizes was to adjust the rates at which customers in lagging 
sites were randomly assigned to the core or core-and-intensive 
groups. (As mentioned earlier, originally only 12 percent of all WIA 
customers were supposed to be referred to these two groups.) In short, 
achieving the target number of customers in these groups was crucial 
to maintaining the study’s power. Since the total number of custom-
ers was lower than expected in some sites, we had to increase the 
proportion of customers assigned to these groups. In addition, the 
study enrollment period for some of the participating local areas was 
extended beyond the originally planned 12 months to allow for addi-
tional sample buildup. In the end, the study met its enrollment targets 
for customers assigned to the core and core-and-intensive groups. 
Interpreting the Study’s Results
The flexibility and adaptations the study team makes in response 
to the realities of designing and executing an experimental study in 
the context of social programs have implications for the interpretation 
of the study’s results. Key challenges include the following:
The counterfactual is weaker than anticipated in some sites
The services available to control group members in the broader 
community often vary across sites, sometimes substantially. If control 
group members in sites with many similar alternative services make 
use of those services, the differences between the treatment and con-
trol groups are narrowed. This makes it more difficult for the study 
to detect impacts of the program. For example, in some LWIAs par-
ticipating in the WIA Evaluation, there was no other public source 
of training funds available, whereas in others, alternative sources of 
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training funds were readily available. This meant that the treatment-
control contrast was weaker in the latter sites, again making it harder 
to detect program impacts.
If the suitability assessment conducted during the design phase 
identifies sites where a lot of alternative services are available, the 
study team can consider excluding such service-rich sites. Some-
times, however, the extent of alternatives available is not known until 
after the study is launched and data are collected. In those instances, 
the evaluation’s results must be interpreted through the lens of what 
was actually being tested on the ground, and not in theory. Doing 
this requires investigating and documenting the services available to 
the control group and, if possible, capturing control-group service 
receipt. When statistical power allows, impacts can be investigated 
by site and compared among those with strong treatment-control dif-
ferentials and those with weaker ones.
The sample size is lower than anticipated
Strategies to increase recruitment and enrollment in programs 
are not always effective, and sample sizes can fall short of targets. 
There are limited options available in this scenario. If the analysis 
was planned to be done by site, the data analysis could instead pool 
the sites to boost statistical power. However, the conceptual model of 
the program and the research questions of interest would have to sug-
gest that pooling could be appropriate. For instance, it might not make 
sense to pool sites with completely different service delivery strate-
gies and target populations, even if they are funded by the same grant.
 In these scenarios, conducting post hoc power analyses is useful 
for determining the magnitude of effects the study can detect, given 
its realized sample sizes. This can help policymakers and others bet-
ter interpret the study’s findings. For instance, a large but statistically 
insignificant point estimate could indicate a lack of statistical power, 
rather than the lack of a true impact of the program on the outcome 
of interest.
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Sample attrition is high
Sometimes it can be difficult to locate study participants for 
follow-up data collection efforts. This is especially true when the 
program under study targets a hard-to-reach population, such as 
homeless people or formerly incarcerated adults. When experiments 
have high overall study attrition, or large differences in attrition rates 
between the treatment and control groups, the amount of bias in the 
impact estimates rises, making us less confident in the study’s results. 
The What Works Clearinghouse, a systematic evidence review proj-
ect funded by the U.S. Department of Education, developed a bias 
model that specifies the combinations of overall and differential attri-
tion that are acceptable in experimental studies. Studies that exceed 
the specified thresholds are considered to have a high likelihood of 
biased impact estimates. 
In cases of high overall or differential sample attrition, a carefully 
controlled analysis is one approach to reducing bias in the estimated 
impacts. Ideally, the authors would include controls for the demo-
graphic characteristics of the study sample and preprogram measures 
of the outcomes that are of interest to the study. In a study examining 
the impact of a job training program on earnings, this preprogram 
measure could include the earnings history of participants leading up 
to the point of random assignment.1 Another approach is to explicitly 
demonstrate that the study participants included in the analysis sam-
ple (i.e., those for whom follow-up data were available) were simi-
lar in preprogram demographics and outcomes at the time of random 
assignment. This can be done by performing statistical tests of the 
baseline differences between the study groups. However, ultimately, 
high attrition of study participants cannot be “controlled away,” and 
many evidence reviews would downgrade such studies.
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LESSONS LEARNED
In this paper, we’ve sought to draw on experiences in design-
ing and conducting three large-scale experimental studies to discuss 
how on-the-ground realities influence the design, implementation, 
and results of these studies. In many cases, a flexible and adaptable 
approach to the evaluation can mitigate the issues encountered. We 
hope that the lessons we have learned from these and other evaluations 
can inform future efforts. Specifically, we offer the following advice: 
• When selecting sites for the evaluation, think carefully about
the objectives of the study and the characteristics of the sites
that could potentially participate. Are they strong or weak im-
plementers? Do they likely have sufficient sample size? What
is the availability of similar services in the community? Bal-
ance the needs for representativeness and for evaluating the
program as closely as possible to how it would operate in the
absence of the study against the need for feasibility in suc-
cessfully implementing the study at the site.
• When recruiting sites to participate in an experiment, prepare
easy-to-understand materials about the goals and benefits of
the study and its ethics. Have in mind concessions that could
be offered to the sites to minimize the impact of study partici-
pation on their service delivery. Make sure all stakeholders are
at the table during the recruiting process.
• If possible, involve federal sponsors of the study during site
recruitment and throughout the course of the evaluation to
demonstrate a commitment to and support of the study.
• For demonstrations, recruit sites with a strong commitment
to and interest in the concept being tested, as well as interest
in learning from the study’s results. Build feedback loops for
staff and program administrators to learn how the demonstra-
tion program operates in practice, what services are provided
to referred clients, and what benefits participants derive from
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the opportunity to participate. This information is critical to 
sustain enthusiasm for the program and a commitment to of-
fering the program to suitable candidates.
• If study resources permit, compensate sites for their time and
effort spent implementing the study—this helps to achieve
buy-in, facilitates site recruitment, and lessens the burden on
site staff.
• Develop both detailed manuals and easy-to-use resources to
support implementation; quick reference guides are key. For
demonstrations, be clear on the elements that must be pre-
served and those that can be adapted; aim for flexibility wher-
ever possible.
• Reserve resources to provide lots of training and ongoing sup-
port for the study sites. Designate a site liaison to facilitate
communication about the evaluation, monitor site progress
early to correct any mistakes, and monitor sites on an ongo-
ing basis to ensure they maintain their focus on and fidelity
to evaluation procedures. Adapt the frequency and intensity
of monitoring as needed. Implementation issues can evolve
and change over time, especially in the context of a multiyear
program. For instance, staff turnover, the business cycle, and
spikes or severe dips in application rates or program referrals
can all affect study implementation at various points in time.
• Take proactive steps to minimize the burden on local staff.
For example, automate procedures to the extent possible and,
if feasible, embed data collection into existing management
information systems. Provide ready-made resources for staff,
such as promotional brochures and posters, run help lines to
handle questions about the program, and designate a single
point of contact from the study team to handle questions or
concerns from local staff. Share information about burden-
reducing and other facilitating strategies or resources that par-
ticipating sites develop on their own.
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• Document variation in program implementation and services
available to the control group to help interpret results.
• If, despite the adaptations made along the way, issues remain
with the implementation of the experiment, conduct supple-
mentary analyses when possible and discuss the results. For
instance, conduct post hoc power analyses if sample sizes
are low, change the analysis approach if implementation was
not strong in some sites or the treatment-control contrast was
weak, and include controls or demonstrate baseline equiva-
lence if attrition was high. Although these methods might not
answer the original research questions of interest with the
level of rigor originally intended, they can still provide mean-
ingful answers to important questions about the effectiveness
of programs under study.
Note
The projects discussed in this chapter were funded, either wholly or in part, 
with federal funds from the U.S. Department of Labor, Employment and 
Training Administration. The contents of this chapter do not necessarily 
reflect the views or policies of USDOL, nor does mention of trade names, 
commercial products, or organizations imply endorsement of same by the 
U.S. government. 
1. Some systematic evidence reviews, including the Clearinghouse for
Labor Evaluation and Research, require that earnings and employment
history be measured for more than one year before random assignment
to guard against the Ashenfelter dip.
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Chapter 3
An Example of a Low-Cost 
Intervention to Target Services 
to Participants of a Local  
Welfare-to-Work Program
Randall W. Eberts
W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research
This chapter shows how low-cost interventions can be integrated
into the operations of existing workforce programs. Recent interest 
in using lessons from behavioral economics to improve participation 
and engagement in social programs has led to a growing number of 
initiatives. These initiatives have attempted to use randomized con-
trolled trial (RCT) experiments to improve program design, particu-
larly in the way information is presented to participants. The admin-
istration of President Obama made this approach a priority in how it 
administered social programs. In 2014 the administration created the 
Social and Behavioral Sciences Team (SBST), dubbed the “Nudge 
Squad”—presumably after Richard Thaler and Cass Sunstein’s 
(2008) influential book titled Nudge. Their book documents the use of 
behavioral science in improving participation in social programs and 
thus the effectiveness of the programs. Even before the creation of the 
SBST, the administration used lessons from behavioral economics in 
designing certain programs included in the American Recovery and 
Reinvestment Act so that consumers would respond more quickly and 
effectively to the economic stimulus initiatives. This result will be 
elaborated upon in Chapter 5.
The United Kingdom (UK) has also pursued lessons from the 
insights of behavioral economics. In 2010 the UK Cabinet Office 
established the Behavioural Insights Team for the purpose of finding 
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“intelligent ways to encourage, support and enable people to make 
better choices for themselves” (Behavioural Insights Team 2011, p. 
3). One of its first interventions was to work with staff from Jobcentre 
Plus offices, which are similar to the U.S. One-Stop Career Centers, 
to redesign the process individuals go through when they sign on to 
receive benefits and begin their job search process. Since then, the 
Behavioural Insights Team has conducted more than 150 randomized 
controlled trials evaluating interventions in a wide variety of social 
areas.1 
According to a survey paper by Babcock et al. (2012), “behav-
ioral economics stresses empirical findings of behavior that are par-
tially at odds with standard economic assumptions. The key empiri-
cal findings from field research in behavioral economics suggest that 
individuals can make systematic errors or be put off by complexity, 
that they procrastinate, and that they hold nonstandard preferences 
and nonstandard beliefs” (p. 2). Therefore, insights from behavioral 
economics focus on ways to simplify complex decision-making pro-
cesses that may tax the ability of individuals to navigate government 
programs effectively. The SBST projects in the United States and the 
Behavioural Insights Team initiatives in Great Britain are designed 
primarily to address the behavioral barriers that affect how people 
engage with programs (National Science and Technology Council 
2015). While the expected results may be modest, so are the costs, 
which could lead to large returns on investment. 
The Obama administration formalized the use of behavioral 
insights by directing federal agencies to initiate and test such proce-
dures. In 2013 the administration sent a memo to the heads of federal 
agencies stating that “many innovative companies use rapidly con-
ducted randomized field trials to identify high impact innovations and 
move them quickly into production.”2 While randomized controlled 
trials are not a new approach to evaluating social programs, in the 
past, most RCT evaluations were hugely expensive and took years to 
conduct and analyze. The approach advocated by the Obama admin-
istration was to try to streamline the evaluation process by embedding 
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the process within the programs receiving the interventions. This is 
possible if agencies already collect data that record participant out-
comes and characteristics and if participants can easily be randomly 
selected into control groups and treatment groups. 
For example, a conference on RCT held in the summer of 2014 
and sponsored by the Office of Technology Policy and the Coalition 
for Evidence-Based Policy explored effective ways to embed low-
cost RCTs in government social programs. Participants asserted that 
the following three steps should be taken: 1) acquire greater research 
access to government administrative data, such as unemployment 
insurance (UI) wage records for workforce programs, with appropri-
ate privacy protections; 2) generate increased government funding 
opportunities that specifically focus on low-cost RCTs; and 3) cre-
ate more high-profile competitions and challenges for low-cost RCTs, 
such as those launched by the Coalition for Evidence-Based Policy 
(Shankar 2014). 
Missing from this list of necessary steps for carrying out low-
cost RCTs, particularly for public workforce development programs, 
is the willingness of state and local agencies to participate in such 
programs. Directing federal agencies to pursue low-cost RCTs may 
be the first step, but in a decentralized workforce system—which is 
the approach taken in the United States in which state and local agen-
cies have considerable autonomy in deciding whether they would like 
to participate in activities such as RCTs—it is necessary to consider 
the motivations and incentives for them to be involved. Without local 
involvement, it is impossible to embed behavioral insight–related 
interventions into most government social programs. 
Despite the intense interest by the Obama administration in using 
low-cost RCTs to evaluate the effectiveness of behavioral insights 
in federal programs, few initiatives were directed at workforce pro-
grams.3 The 2015 and 2016 annual reports of the SBST list nearly 40 
projects, and only 2 involve federal workforce programs (National 
Science and Technology Council 2015, 2016). At least one effort to 
conduct a low-cost RCT at local workforce investment boards was 
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thwarted by the boards’ reluctance to participate. Consequently, it is 
paramount to identify local workforce boards with interested staff and 
an organizational and incentive structure conducive to undertaking 
these experiments.
Therefore, the purpose of this chapter is twofold. First, it describes 
the prerequisites for successful implementation of such interventions 
in workforce programs, including incentives to enlist local workforce 
boards. Second, it describes a program that successfully integrated 
a simple but effective low-cost intervention and evaluation into a 
workforce program. While the program described here is not new (the 
pilot was conducted in the late 1990s and early 2000s) and has been 
reported in previous publications, it still is instructive in providing an 
example that may guide the implementation of future initiatives.4 Fur-
thermore, since the program has already been evaluated using RCT, 
which was embedded in the intervention, the outcomes of the inter-
vention are available, whereas many of the more recent projects are 
still awaiting the completion of an evaluation.
THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT’S INTEREST IN 
LOW-COST RCTs
By establishing the Social and Behavioral Sciences Team in 
2014, the Obama administration institutionalized the use of behav-
ioral insights at the federal level. SBST was a cross-agency team, 
housed in the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy, 
with the purpose of translating findings and methods from the social 
and behavioral sciences into improvements in federal policies and 
programs (National Science and Technology Council 2015).5 During 
its first year of operation, its team focused on executing proof-of- 
concept projects in which behavioral insights could be embedded 
directly into programs at a low cost and could lead to quantifiable 
and immediate improvements in program outcomes. The team pur-
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sued two areas where behavioral science could play a significant role: 
1) improving access to programs and 2) improving government effi-
ciency. Seventeen projects are listed in the SBST 2015 annual report;
these include promoting retirement savings, improving college
access, increasing medical insurance coverage, and reducing delin-
quent debt repayments, among several others. Many of the projects
included simple ways to communicate with individuals to improve
their engagement in federal programs.
On September 15, 2015, behavioral insights were further codified 
into federal social policy when President Obama signed an execu-
tive order that encouraged federal agencies to “design . . . policies 
and programs to reflect our best understanding of how people engage 
with, participate in, use, and respond to those policies and programs.” 
In the words of the order, it specifically directed agencies to take the 
following four actions:
1) Identify opportunities to help qualifying individuals, fami-
lies, communities, and businesses access public programs
and benefits by . . . removing administrative hurdles, short-
ening wait times, and simplifying forms;
2) Improve how information is presented to consumers . . . by
considering how the content, format, timing, and medium
by which information is conveyed affects comprehension
and action by individuals, as appropriate;
3) Identify programs that offer choices and carefully consider
how the presentation and structure of those choices, includ-
ing the order, number, and arrangement of options, can most
effectively promote public welfare, as appropriate, giv-
ing particular consideration to the selection and setting of
default options; and
4) Review elements of their policies and programs that are
designed to encourage or make it easier for Americans to
take specific actions . . . (White House 2015).
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WILLINGNESS OF STATE AND LOCAL AGENCIES TO 
CONDUCT BEHAVIORAL EXPERIMENTS
While a presidential executive order, like the one President Obama 
issued incorporating behavioral insights into federal programs, gets 
the attention of federal officials, it may not be as effective in elicit-
ing the participation of states and local agencies. The nation’s work-
force system, currently operating under the Workforce Innovation and 
Opportunity Act (WIOA), is a federal-state-local partnership. Most 
funding and guidelines originate from the federal government, but the 
local workforce investment boards (WIBs) have direct responsibility 
for delivering the services to customers. The WIBs develop strategic 
plans that target services to meet the needs of customers (both job 
seekers and employers) and contract with local providers to deliver 
services. While they must meet the requirements of WIOA, the local 
boards and their staff have some discretion in the operations, includ-
ing whether to participate in additional programs or activities that 
may be beyond the scope of the WIOA legislation and state mandates. 
The willingness of states and local workforce boards to partici-
pate in programs that involve low-cost RCTs, or even in large-scale 
evaluations funded by the U.S. Department of Labor, varies widely. 
Stephen Wandner, the editor of this volume and a longtime USDOL 
official involved with federal evaluations, describes in his book Solv-
ing the Reemployment Puzzle the negotiations required between 
USDOL and the states to implement various large-scale evaluation 
projects. He writes that establishing what became known as the New 
Jersey Experiment, one of the most consequential evaluations of 
workforce programs and UI systems, rested on convincing the state 
of New Jersey to participate. Issues included the following three: 
1) providing funding for the state to cover additional costs, includ-
ing alteration of regular services to accommodate the evaluation;
2) determining whether state officials would be willing to participate
in a randomized controlled trial in which a preselected group of cus-
tomers are denied services; and 3) addressing the concern of state
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officials as to whether the results would shine a favorable light on 
New Jersey. Ultimately, the state agreed to serve as the demonstration 
site and was awarded $4.7 million for operating the evaluation when 
the program began in 1986 (Wandner 2010). 
Many of the same issues that confront a state in deciding to con-
duct a large evaluation, such as the New Jersey Experiment, also con-
front a local WIB in deciding whether to engage in a low-cost RCT.
Are staff interested in exploring ways to improve the services they 
offer to customers? Can they come up with possible interventions on 
their own that they consider valid ways to improve the services pro-
vided? Are they comfortable with adopting practices and procedures 
that are introduced by researchers who are outside the workforce pro-
grams? Are they receptive to evaluators “looking over their shoul-
ders” as they provide services? Can they take constructive criticism, 
if the intervention is shown not to work, and learn from the experi-
ence? In the same vein, can they learn from a successful intervention 
and implement continuous improvement?
In confronting these questions, successful engagement by WIBs 
and their staff first requires a culture that promotes and supports inno-
vation, kindles a desire to find ways to improve services, embraces 
data-driven decisions, and accommodates a level of comfort with 
research methods. Staff must be willing to experiment with new 
ideas and approaches and accept the fact that not all ideas actually 
work. A culture that encourages risk taking may be counter to the 
culture to which many staff are accustomed. The workforce system 
has been subject to strict performance metrics since the days of the 
Job Training Partnership Act. Staffs from many WIBs are reluctant 
to try approaches that may cause them not to meet or exceed their 
performance targets. To overcome this hesitancy, a culture of innova-
tion and risk taking must permeate the local organization. The board, 
leadership, and staff must be willing to take a chance on innovative 
ideas and communicate to others the same sentiment. 
Second, local WIBs need support from state agencies that will 
encourage such a culture and provide the resources necessary to carry 
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out such interventions. As for resources, RCT evaluations cannot be 
carried out without the proper data, and in many states the required 
data, such as UI wage records, are held closely by state agencies, 
which do not always share their data with local WIBs. Without access 
to UI wage records to track the employment outcomes of members of 
both the control and treatment groups, RCT—or any other evaluation 
methodology—is much more difficult and expensive to implement, if 
not impossible. Some states—Ohio, for example—have established a 
data clearinghouse in which researchers can access UI wage records 
and other administrative data to conduct evaluations and pursue per-
tinent research.6 This arrangement in Ohio serves as an example for 
other states to follow. 
Third, as much as possible, interventions need to be designed to 
be embedded seamlessly in the daily operations, and this includes 
the random-assignment component as well. Since in most cases these 
low-cost interventions are “nudges” and not radical changes in pro-
gram offerings or in the delivery of services, the minimal disruption 
of operations for staff and customers helps to make participation more 
palatable. 
Fourth, sponsors of low-cost interventions should be prepared 
to compensate local WIBs for their participation. Nevertheless, the 
fact that they are called “low-cost” means that few additional funds 
may be available for such a purpose. Ideally, a data-driven staff will 
see its engagement in innovative approaches as a way to improve 
outcomes, which could be considered incentive enough, particularly 
within a culture such as described above. The fact that WIOA is out-
come based, research focused, and driven by objective metrics helps 
to promote such motivations. 
Fifth, local WIBs (and state agencies) need access to talented 
researchers who can help design and then evaluate such interventions. 
Even if frontline staff have identified the intervention that they believe 
will improve customer service and program outcomes, researchers 
who are expert in the design and implementation of evaluations are 
needed to carry out the experiment. 
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RELEVANCE OF THE WORK-FIRST PILOT TO THE 
ADMINISTRATION’S GOALS FOR RCTs 
The Upjohn Institute initiated the low-cost RCT described in 
this chapter long before the Obama administration directed federal 
agencies to pursue such interventions. In the late 1990s, the Institute 
received funding from the USDOL to defray the costs of housing, 
designing, conducting, and evaluating the intervention. The Institute 
was interested in carrying out such an experiment because of the 
Institute’s unique marriage of research and operations. Having both 
functions together within one organization fosters a culture of innova-
tion, experimentation, and evaluation, as described above. Other rea-
sons for staff’s willingness to participate in the pilot were the antici-
pated improvement in the operation of the program (such as improved 
handling of information and the targeted referrals of customers to ser-
vices) and the minimal disruption to services since the intervention 
and evaluation were embedded in the operations. 
The pilot program described here illustrates four aspects of the 
Obama administration’s concept of low-cost RCTs. First, the pilot 
focuses on two of the four directives to federal agencies in the presi-
dent’s executive order: 1) improve how information is presented 
and 2) improve how choices of programs are presented to custom-
ers. The pilot streamlines the intake process by reducing the number 
of times participants must fill out registration forms, and it tries to 
match participants with providers that are better suited to respond 
to their specific needs. Second, part of the setup of this intervention 
was based on establishing an employability score, which was derived 
from statistical procedures similar to the profiling score required 
under Worker Profiling and Reemployment Services. Behavioral sci-
entists, as reported in Babcock et al. (2012), advocate using profiling 
when assigning participants to various job search assistance services 
in order to minimize their procrastination in engaging in available 
programs. Third, the pilot embeds an RCT experiment directly in the 
intake process by randomly assigning participants (stratified by three 
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levels of employability) to one of three service providers. Fourth, the 
RCT uses administrative data generated by the program to record 
participant characteristics and employment outcomes. This technique 
provides a low-cost evaluation instrument that can yield results in a 
short period of time. 
Description of the Work First Pilot
The purpose of Michigan’s Work First program was to move wel-
fare recipients into jobs as quickly as possible. The program provided 
welfare recipients with reemployment skills, support, and opportuni-
ties to obtain employment, and it offered instruction in the proper 
techniques for writing résumés, completing applications, and inter-
viewing for jobs. The purpose of the pilot was to improve the employ-
ment outcomes of participants in the state welfare-to-work program 
by streamlining the referral process so that services could be tailored 
to best meet the needs of participants. 
At the time of the pilot, the Kalamazoo–St. Joseph Workforce 
Development Board contracted with three organizations to provide 
services under the Work First program. While each provider offered 
services required under the law, the three differed in their approach 
and in the mix of services provided. Institute staff administering the 
program observed that some participants responded more favorably 
to one approach than another, and they wanted to see if they could 
devise a system that would assign recipients to providers that best 
met their needs and in a style that best fit their personalities. The pilot 
referred welfare-to-work participants to one of three service provid-
ers based on a statistical algorithm that used administrative data to 
determine which provider offered services that were shown to be 
most effective for customers possessing specific characteristics and 
employment backgrounds. Prior to the pilot, participants were ran-
domly assigned to providers. Information collected at that time was 
used to “teach” the referral algorithm which providers delivered the 
best outcomes for individuals with certain characteristics from each 
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of the three employability groups. The pilot demonstrated that cus-
tomizing services based on participant characteristics could increase 
the effectiveness and efficiency of the intervention. An RCT evalua-
tion of the pilot demonstrated that customizing services based on par-
ticipant characteristics could increase the effectiveness and efficiency 
of the program, as seen by an increase in the 90-day employment 
retention rate of participants and a benefit-cost ratio of three to one.  
Description of the Referral Process
Institute staff worked closely with the local office of the state’s 
social service agency, the Family Independence Agency, to adminis-
ter the Work First program. The Family Independence Agency deter-
mined welfare eligibility, issued welfare payments, and referred wel-
fare recipients to Work First programs, while the Work First agency 
provided welfare recipients with employment services through 
intermediaries. 
The Family Independence Agency referred all qualified appli-
cants to Work First within 10 days of their applying for cash assis-
tance. Applicants were notified of the date and time they were to 
enroll in the program and attend orientation. Orientation included 
an introduction to the Work First program, specification of the roles 
and responsibilities of the program and client, and a brief assessment 
of the client’s situation and immediate needs, including the possible 
need for supportive services. In-depth assessment and counseling 
were offered only to those in considerable need. 
The Work First pilot incorporated a statistical assessment and 
referral system into the initial intake and orientation process. Each 
welfare recipient who enrolled in Work First was immediately 
assigned a score indicating his or her probability of finding employ-
ment. The score provided an assessment of each participant’s need for 
services, based upon the past experiences of local Work First partici-
pants who had observable characteristics like that participant. A high 
score indicated that a person had little need of services, since past par-
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ticipants with the same set of characteristics had shown a high prob-
ability of finding a job without much if any intervention. Those with 
a low score required more services, since past recipients with similar 
attributes had less success in finding and retaining employment. Each 
participant was then referred to one of three subcontractors within 
each of the employability scores.
Data were obtained from the intake forms and tracking system 
developed and maintained by the Kalamazoo–St. Joseph Workforce 
Development Board. By recording the type of activity, the number of 
hours engaged in each activity, and the starting and ending dates of 
each activity, it was possible to piece together a sequence of activi-
ties between the time participants entered and the time they left the 
program.
Design of the Evaluation
The pilot was evaluated using a randomized controlled trial, 
which was embedded in the intake process. The random-assignment 
procedure took place in three steps. First, participants were divided 
into one of three groups, depending upon their employability score. 
Assignment of participants to the three employability groups was 
based not on a predetermined cutoff value but on their ranking in the 
distribution of employability scores of those who enrolled in Work 
First at that session. Those participants with employability scores in 
the lowest 40 percent of the distribution were assigned to the low 
employability group (L), the next 20 percent were assigned to the 
middle group (M), and the highest 40 percent were assigned to the 
high group (H). The middle group included only 20 percent of the 
participants since the treatment provider for that group could accom-
modate only that percentage of participants because of capacity 
constraints. 
Second, those within each employability group were randomly 
divided between control and treatment groups of equal size. Third, 
enrollees in the control group were randomly assigned to one of the 
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three providers. Those in the treatment group were assigned to a 
predetermined provider that the evidence showed to be most effec-
tive for those in one of the three employability groups. The evalua-
tion included 3,600 welfare recipients who entered the Kalamazoo– 
St. Joseph Work First program from March 1998 to March 2000. 
The primary outcome measure for the evaluation is the retention 
rate—that is, whether a participant was employed for 90 consecutive 
days after exiting the program. Table 3.1 shows the retention rates 
of those in the control and treatment groups by employability group 
and provider. In this case, there is considerable variation both across 
groups and within groups. Note that the actual retention rate averaged 
for each group increases from the lowest employability group to the 
highest. For the control group, it increases from 11.6 percent for the 
lowest group to 21.7 percent for the highest employability group. The 
treatment group also follows the pattern of exhibiting increased reten-
tion rates from low to high employability groups. 
Retention Rates by Various Combinations of Providers
Three providers delivered services to the Work First participants 
in the pilot. It is obvious from Table 3.1 that the retention rates var-
ied across employability groups and providers within those groups. 
Employability 










A 15.3 15.4 21.9 22.6
B 7.9 14.5 22.3 23.4
C 13.6 37.0 17.0 16.7
Average 11.6 20.8 21.7
Table 3.1  Retention Rates, by Provider and Employability Group (%)
SOURCE: Author’s calculations of Kalamazoo–St. Joseph Work First administrative 
data, 1996–1997.
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To be more precise about the retention rates resulting from different 
combinations of providers, we examined six combinations of refer-
rals. Since participants in the control group were randomly assigned 
to each of the three providers within each employability group, we 
used the retention rates for each group, as reported in Table 3.1, to 
compute the retention rates for each of the six combinations. The 
combinations are denoted in the following way: the letter refers to 
the provider, and its position in the combination of three letters refers 
to the assignment of participants from an employability group to that 
provider. For example, the first combination, acb, refers to members 
of the low employability group assigned to provider a, members of 
the middle employability group assigned to provider c, and members 
of the high employability group assigned to provider b.
Figure 3.1 displays the retention rates for the six groups, start-
ing from the left with the combination yielding the highest retention 
rate and moving to the right with combinations yielding successively 
lower retention rates.7 The difference between the retention rates of 
the highest-yielding combination (acb) and the combination with the 
lowest retention rate (bac) is 8.0 percentage points, and the difference 
between the combination with the highest retention rate and the reten-
tion rate if all participants were randomly assigned is 4.8 percentage 
points. Differences between any of the pairs of combinations are sta-
tistically significant at the 95 percent level. 
BENEFIT-COST ANALYSIS OF THE STATISTICAL  
ASSESSMENT AND REFERRAL SYSTEM
The benefits of using the statistical assessment and referral sys-
tem can be quantified by considering the earnings received by those 
additional participants who retained their jobs. As shown in the pre-
vious section, the optimal assignment rule yielded a net increase of 
47 participants who retained their jobs for 90 consecutive days over 
the number retaining their jobs for that length of time in the group 
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created by random assignment. Consequently, the net effect of the 
statistical assessment and referral system is computed by considering 
the difference in retention rates and earnings of the two groups. A 
benefit-to-cost ratio is then calculated by dividing the net effect by the 
cost of the pilot.8 Two scenarios were considered. The first scenario 
assumes that the difference in the number of participants retaining 
their jobs for 90 days persists for eight quarters. The second scenario 
assumes that the difference in job retention narrows throughout the 
eight-quarter period until the two series are equal. In both scenarios, 
wages are assumed to grow by 3 percent a year, and a 10 percent 
Figure 3.1  Retention Rates for Various Combinations of the Three 
Providers According to Employability Group Assigned 
to Them
NOTE: In the x axis, the letters signifying providers a, b, and c have their order deter-
mined as follows: first letter = the provider to which the low employability group 
is assigned; second letter = the provider to which the middle employability group 

















Combinations of the three providers
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annual discount rate is used when computing the net present value of 
the earnings streams. Dividing the net present value for each scenario 
by the program costs of $145,000 yields a benefit-to-cost ratio for the 
first scenario of 5.8 and a ratio for the second scenario of 3.3.9 
SUMMARY
The potential of improving the effectiveness of social programs 
by incorporating behavioral insights into the delivery of services has 
received considerable attention among policymakers. The Obama 
administration encouraged federal agencies to find ways to improve 
programs through behavioral insights and established a special task 
force to help them with that effort. This chapter discusses how such 
efforts can become more widespread, particularly for programs that 
depend on a federal-state-local partnership to deliver services, such as 
is the case for the national workforce programs. The chapter offers the 
example of a USDOL-funded pilot conducted in the late 1990s as an 
illustration of how low-cost interventions in workforce programs can 
improve employment outcomes of participants. The pilot is relevant 
for the current interest in low-cost RCT experiments, in that it dem-
onstrates how a simple improvement in the referral of participants to 
services can improve outcomes, how RCT can be embedded in the 
existing program, and how administrative data can be used to mini-
mize the cost and disruption of the evaluation. It also illustrates the 
type of culture and the amount of resources needed for local WIBs to 
be willing to engage in such projects.
The Upjohn Institute conducted the pilot through its division that 
administers Work First programs and other workforce programs for 
the local workforce investment area. The unique organizational struc-
ture of the Institute, which combines both research and operations, 
perhaps offers some lessons of what it would take for other states and 
local WIBs to be able to undertake similar projects, short of establish-
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ing a similar organization. Based on the experience of conducting 
this pilot, one could conclude that for such ventures to be success-
ful, it takes a culture of innovation, evidence-based decision making, 
the willingness to take some risks, and expertise in designing, imple-
menting, and evaluating social experiments. The RCT showed that 
the pilot improved participants’ employment outcomes with a benefit-
cost ratio of greater than three to one. 
The recent initiative for using low-cost interventions and RCTs to 
improve social programs came about from one administration’s desire 
to improve the delivery of social services through insights gleaned 
from research in behavioral science. To sustain such efforts into the 
future, a culture of innovation, experimentation, and research must 
be embedded in the programs and the organizations responsible for 
administering those programs. The WIOA legislation, which governs 
the national workforce programs, codifies some aspects of a culture 
of innovation and assessment by requiring each state to evaluate the 
effectiveness of their programs on a regular basis using a rigorous 
methodology. It also mandates the use of a statistical methodology by 
states to adjust their performance targets. 
For such legislation to nurture a culture throughout the system, 
there must be strong leadership at all three levels of the partnership—
federal, state, and local—as well as a willingness to demonstrate 
flexibility. For example, the USDOL could be more willing to grant 
waivers to states and local WIBs to exempt them from meeting per-
formance standards for short periods of time so they can pursue inno-
vative ideas and approaches. States could demonstrate a willingness 
to support the pursuit of RCTs through making available the neces-
sary data (e.g., UI wage records and other administrative records) and 
by creating an environment that encourages experimentation. Such an 
environment could be nurtured by offering forums for the exchange of 
ideas and creating a clearinghouse for the use of data. Finally, states 
and local WIBs could reach out to researchers from universities and 
other research organizations to partner on the design and evaluation 
of low-cost interventions. 
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Notes
1. Recently, the Behavioural Insights Team has evolved into a social pur-
pose company and is no longer embedded in the Cabinet Office.
2. “Memorandum to the Heads of Departments and Agencies,” Office of
Management and Budget, July 2013.
3. One of the USDOL-sponsored “nudge” programs directed at workforce
programs is being conducted at the Upjohn Institute through its divi-
sion that administers WIOA programs for a four-county area in South-
west Michigan. The program was developed by frontline staff with the
assistance of Ideas42 and Mathematica. It is being evaluated using an
embedded RCT experiment.
4. The description of the pilot included in this chapter draws heavily from
Eberts (2002).
5. SBST’s website is inactive, suggesting that SBST has not been contin-
ued under the subsequent administration. A message at the top of the
home page says, “This is historical material ‘frozen in time’ on January
20, 2017. This website will no longer be updated.”
6. For an example, see www.ohioanalytics.gov.
7. More than six combinations are possible with three providers and three
groups by assigning more than one employability group to a provider.
However, we adhered to the workforce development board’s contractual
arrangement during the pilot that all three providers should deliver ser-
vices. Therefore, we eliminated from consideration combinations that
assigned two or three groups to one service provider.
8. The social value of the new system may be less than the value computed
here because of displacement effects among the welfare population. It is 
conceivable that the additional retention by participants of the program
with the new system may displace other welfare recipients from their
existing jobs or preclude new Work First participants from finding jobs,
since the additional retentions reduce the number of job vacancies.
9. The amount of $145,000 includes only the costs of developing and oper-
ating the statistical referral system over the two-year life of the pilot.
It does not include the cost of providing the services once participants
were referred to the providers.
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and the Evolution of the 




In 2005, the U.S. Department of Labor (USDOL) introduced the
Reemployment and Eligibility Assessment (REA) Initiative, which 
provides grants to state workforce agencies to design and implement 
a new program to assist individuals claiming unemployment insur-
ance (UI) benefits. The initiative began with $18 million in grants, 
which were distributed to 21 states and territories in Fiscal Year (FY) 
2005. Since then, the REA program has grown to 44 states and an 
appropriation of $80 million in FY 2015. 
In FY 2016, the Obama administration proposed an increase in 
funding of approximately $100 million to fund a combined Reem-
ployment and Eligibility Assessment and Reemployment Services 
(REA/RES) program. If it is approved by the new administration, 
the proposed funding of $181 million would support an integrated 
approach for assisting unemployed workers to return to work more 
rapidly, thus reducing costs to the UI Trust Fund. The proposed bud-
get request would provide funding for all states to serve the unem-
ployed based on their projected number of targeted UI beneficiaries. 
This chapter describes the evolution of the REA Initiative from a 
small experimental program designed to reduce UI expenditures to a 
permanent program that combines in-person eligibility reviews with 
reemployment services. The chapter begins with a description of the 
background of the conditions that led to the introduction of REA, fol-
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lowed by a summary of prior research on the effectiveness of UI work 
search requirements and reemployment services. Next, the chapter 
presents the early history of the REA Initiative, its implementation, 
and the early research on the impact of REA. Finally, the chapter 
reviews the administration’s new proposal for combining REA and 
RES and concludes with observations on the future of REA/RES. 
BACKGROUND
The Social Security Act of 1935 and the Federal Unemployment 
Tax Act of 1939 established the current federal-state system for pro-
viding temporary and partial wage replacement benefits for covered 
and eligible unemployed workers. Since then, the unemployment 
insurance system has evolved dramatically as the number of benefi-
ciaries has grown over time and as new technologies for administer-
ing the program have been developed and implemented. 
In the early years of the UI program, unemployed individu-
als were required to apply for unemployment benefits in person. In 
recent years, states have modernized and automated the procedures 
for applying for and receiving UI benefits. In 2005, for example, 44 
states accepted initial claims for unemployment insurance by tele-
phone or the Internet (GAO 2005). Today, only three states (Arkan-
sas, Vermont, and West Virginia) do not accept initial UI applications 
filed on the Internet. All other states accept initial and continuing 
claims remotely. As a result, in many states it is currently possible 
for a claimant to file an initial claim and continue to claim benefits 
without speaking to anyone in person.
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AUTOMATION AND DECLINE IN FUNDING FOR 
ADMINISTRATION OF UI 
The secretary of labor is charged with providing funds to states 
for “proper and efficient administration” of state UI programs. These 
administrative funds are used by states to ensure that claimants are 
“monetarily” and “nonmonetarily” eligible to receive UI benefits and 
to refer beneficiaries to job search assistance provided at American 
Job Centers (formerly known as One-Stop Career Centers). 
While past research has shown that connecting UI claimants with 
job opportunities early in their unemployment spell is highly effective 
in promoting reemployment, a number of factors in the 1990s led to 
a growing disconnect between the UI benefits program and the reem-
ployment services programs. One source of this disconnect was the 
elimination of in-person applications for UI benefits. That is, in the 
early days of the UI program, claimants had to come to a local office 
to apply for benefits. The advent of telephone call centers in the 1990s 
and the introduction of Internet applications eliminated the need and 
opportunities for claimants to have any in-person interactions with a 
claims taker or job placement counselor. 
Another source of disconnect between the UI benefits and reem-
ployment services programs has been the gradual reduction in the use 
of the Eligibility Review Program (ERP) since the 1980s. Under the 
ERP, UI beneficiaries were required to report that they remained eli-
gible and were continuing to search for work. Over time, the use of 
ERPs declined—further disconnecting the UI program from oppor-
tunities to connect unemployed individuals to employment services. 
In tandem with the increase in automation and the decline in the 
use of ERPs, funding for administering the UI system declined in 
real terms. Today, funding for administering the UI system (in con-
stant terms) is lower than it was in the 1980s. With insufficient funds 
for the “proper and efficient administration” of state UI programs, 
the federal government has often provided supplemental funding for 
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administering the UI program through various mechanisms, including 
grants for information technology modernization. The introduction 
of the REA Initiative in 2005 may be viewed as a mechanism for 
enhancing funding for UI administration by supporting activities to 
enhance the integrity of UI payments. That is, by providing states 
with REA grants, the federal government was providing funds for 
conducting eligibility reviews, which had declined in previous years 
because of budget constraints. 
PRIOR RESEARCH ON UI WORK SEARCH 
REQUIREMENTS
There is a rich literature on the effectiveness of UI work search 
requirements, employment services, and the combination of work 
search and employment services. For a complete review of this lit-
erature, see Wandner (2010). Below, we summarize some of the key 
studies that evaluated the effectiveness of alternative work search 
requirements. 
One of the earliest studies to investigate the work search require-
ment was the Charleston Claimant Placement and Work Test Dem-
onstration (Corson, Long, and Nicholson 1985). This 1983 study 
randomly assigned UI beneficiaries to three treatment groups: 1) 
enhanced work test, 2) special employment services, and 3) job search 
workshop. The enhanced work test group was required to come in to 
the office to register for work and was subject to termination from UI 
if its members did not register. The treatment was found to be effec-
tive and reduced UI duration by more than a half week of benefits. 
The Washington Alternative Work Search Experiment was 
implemented in 1986 and 1987 in Tacoma, Washington (Johnson 
and Klepinger 1991). The experiment tested the effect of altering the 
number of employer contacts required for continuing eligibility. The 
experiment had three treatment groups: for the first group, the experi-
ment eliminated the reporting of employer contacts; for the second 
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group, it varied the number of employer contacts over time; and for 
the third group, it retained the required contacts and added employ-
ment services early in the unemployment spell. The main finding of 
this study was that the elimination of the reporting requirement sig-
nificantly increased the duration of benefits. Without a need to report 
employer contacts, beneficiaries collected three weeks’ more benefits 
than those who were required to report employer contacts. Thus, the 
conclusion from this study is that the integrity of the UI system is 
affected by the work search requirement. 
The Maryland UI Work Search Demonstration was conducted in 
1994–1995 to test alternative work search requirements (Klepinger 
et al. 1998). In this experimental design evaluation, UI beneficiaries 
were randomly assigned to either a control group that continued the 
normal practice or one of four treatment groups: 1) a group that con-
tinued the normally required two employer work-search contacts and 
offered a job search workshop, 2) a group that increased the required 
number of employer work search contacts from two to four a week, 
3) a group that supplemented the normal two-employer work-search
requirement with information about verification of employer con-
tacts, and 4) a group that did not require claimants to document their
employer contacts. The evaluation found that offering the job search
workshop (Treatment 1) reduced the duration of UI benefits by 0.6
weeks. Increasing the required work search contacts from two to four
employer contacts a week (Treatment 2) reduced the duration of UI
benefits by 0.7 weeks. Informing claimants that their employer con-
tacts might be verified (Treatment 3) had a similar impact—it reduced
the duration of UI benefits by 0.9 weeks. Finally, not requiring claim-
ants to document their employer contacts (Treatment 4) had the oppo-
site impact—it increased the duration of benefits by 0.4 weeks. This
last result was confirmed by a similar finding in a study in Northern
Ireland (McVicar 2010).
In addition to these studies on the impact of alternative work 
search requirements, there have been numerous studies to assess the 
impact of job search assistance and other reemployment services. 
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These studies—e.g., the National Worker Profiling and Reemploy-
ment Services Evaluation (Dickinson et al. 1999), the Kentucky 
Worker Profiling and Reemployment Services Evaluation (Black et 
al. 2003), and the Eight State WIA Implementation Study (Barnow 
and King 2005)—have consistently found significant reductions in 
the duration of UI benefits when reemployment services are offered. 
There is, however, substantial variation across these studies result-
ing from the differences across states in the reemployment services 
provided. 
Currently, USDOL’s Chief Evaluation Office is supporting a 
random-assignment evaluation of REA that is designed to isolate 
the impact of the two major components of the REA/RES program: 
1) the in-person employment eligibility review and 2) reemployment
services. This study may shed light on the relative impact of the two
major components of the program and the interaction between these
components.
EARLY HISTORY OF REA INITIATIVE
The REA Initiative was introduced by USDOL in 2005 as a new 
approach that combines in-person UI eligibility reviews with the pro-
vision of labor market information and referral to reemployment ser-
vices (USDOL 2005). While the REA Initiative began in 2005, its 
features are grounded in past research findings and proven methods of 
administration that have been shown to be efficient and cost effective. 
Below, we present the precursor programs that helped to shape the 
2005 REA features. A complete history of these precursor programs 
can be found in Wandner (2010). 
Beginning in the 1940s, states established rules to require that 
claimants provide evidence of work search contacts. Furthermore, 
some states implemented periodic reviews of claimants’ work search 
efforts after a specified number of weeks. By the late 1960s, the peri-
odic review of eligibility was being tested with different combina-
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tions of job finding, placement services, and training in a series of 
research demonstrations. In the 1970s, research findings were incor-
porated into a national design of the Eligibility Review Program. The 
purpose of this program was to help states to reestablish sound eligi-
bility review processes in the UI program. 
Starting in the early 1990s, states began to implement cost- 
efficient self-service claims-taking and job-finding-and-placement 
systems. In the next few years, many states automated their UI 
systems so that initial and continued claims could be filed through 
touch-tone telephones or the Internet. Using these automated systems, 
claimants were able to respond to questions about their job search 
by pressing or entering “yes” or “no” to standardized questions. This 
increased automation, together with the relocation of UI staff to call 
and data centers, has caused some claimants to become detached from 
the local American Job Centers delivery system. 
In the early 2000s, policymakers recognized that greater atten-
tion should be directed to the continued eligibility review process and 
the reemployment needs of UI claimants. As a result, in March 2005, 
USDOL funded a total of 21 states to provide in-person interviews 
and other services to individuals claiming UI benefits through the 
REA program. The early design of REA required states to select a 
portion of their UI beneficiaries to attend one-on-one interviews in 
person. These interviews included a review of ongoing UI eligibil-
ity, provision of current labor market information, development of a 
work search plan, and referral to reemployment services and training, 
as needed. 
EVALUATIONS OF THE REA INITIATIVE
Soon after USDOL’s selection of the grantees, IMPAQ Interna-
tional was asked by USDOL to provide grantees with technical assis-
tance. This technical assistance to grantees covered both 1) assistance 
in the development of rigorous random-assignment procedures for 
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assigning UI beneficiaries to treatment and control groups and 2) 
assistance in collecting and reporting accurate information on reem-
ployment. This technical assistance was critical to the early develop-
ment of the REA Initiative since, initially, USDOL provided only the 
following five broad guidelines for implementing the REA Initiative 
(USDOL 2004): 
1) Funds may be used only for in-person reemployment and
eligibility assessments for UI beneficiaries that are con-
ducted in One-Stop facilities.
2) Assessments must include labor-market information/
work-search plan development/review, referral to employ-
ment services and to training when appropriate, and eli-
gibility issue detection and referral to adjudication when
appropriate.
3) Grantees must agree to participate in a USDOL-funded
study of the efficacy of the UI REA Initiative.
4) Beneficiaries must report in person to the One-Stop Center
within a specified period of time as part of the assessment.
5) Assessments were to be conducted only for claimants who
did not have a definite return-to-work date.
Within these general parameters, grantees had a great deal of lee-
way in designing their state REA programs. As a result of this flex-
ibility, the programs varied dramatically across the 21 grantees. For 
example, some grantees implemented their program statewide, while 
other grantees implemented their program in selected areas of the 
state. The greatest variation, however, was in how states selected UI 
beneficiaries into a treatment group (those who received REA ser-
vices) and a control group (those who received no REA services). 
For example, some grantees did not understand the requirement for 
rigorous random assignment. Others understood the requirement but 
did not have a computerized random-assignment process and used 
inappropriate random-assignment procedures. Still others selected 
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treatment and control groups from different populations, resulting in 
unequal treatment and control groups. As a result of these difficulties 
and deficient random-assignment procedures, in some states it was 
impossible to measure program effectiveness by comparing outcomes 
of the resulting treatment and control groups. 
TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE AND EVALUATION OF THE 
2005 REA INITIATIVE
IMPAQ began providing technical assistance to grantees in June 
2005. As part of this technical assistance project, IMPAQ analyzed 
the early implementation of nine states’ REA programs. This imple-
mentation analysis revealed that, for the most part, the services pro-
vided to participants followed the general guidelines established by 
the Employment and Training Administration. That is, states were 
successful in conducting in-person REA sessions that combined 
verification of continued eligibility for UI benefits with referral to 
reemployment services. However, the analysis also revealed that 
states had difficulty in complying with the requirements to develop 
an appropriate methodology for three aspects: 1) selecting treatment 
and comparison groups, 2) collecting outcomes data for the treatment 
and comparison groups, and 3) submitting accurate data to USDOL. 
IMPAQ’s implementation analysis of nine states revealed that 
several states were not able to accurately implement the required 
random-assignment procedures. In addition, states had difficulty in 
collecting and reporting accurate outcome information for the selected 
treatment and control group members. For example, several states 
indicated that they would be delayed or entirely unable to submit the 
two required outcome reports: 1) the ETA 9128 Reemployment and 
Eligibility Assessment Activities report and 2) the ETA 9129 Reem-
ployment and Eligibility Assessment Outcomes report. As a result of 
these difficulties, an alternative methodology was developed to assess 
the early impacts of the REA program. 
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Since states were unable to provide the required data to assess pro-
gram impacts, IMPAQ and ETA developed an alternative methodol-
ogy for assessing the effectiveness of the REA Initiative. Specifically, 
IMPAQ developed a methodology that used state UI administrative 
records and follow-up interview data to assess REA effectiveness. 
This approach was used in evaluating REA effectiveness in two states 
that had designed and implemented rigorous random-assignment 
procedures—Minnesota and North Dakota (Benus et al. 2008). We 
describe these impact assessments below.
Minnesota implemented the REA Initiative in 12 One-Stop 
Career Centers. Since Wagner-Peyser Act funds were already avail-
able to serve claimants whose profiling scores were high (i.e., those 
in the top third), Minnesota designed its REA Initiative to serve the 
middle third of profiled claimants. Thus, the Minnesota REA Initia-
tive did not serve claimants who were the most likely to exhaust their 
UI benefits or the least likely to exhaust UI benefits; rather, the Min-
nesota program was designed to serve those in the middle. 
For this target population, Minnesota designed a rigorous 
random-assignment process. Individuals were randomly assigned to 
either a control group (no REA services) or to one of two treatment 
groups: 
• T1: single REA interview group—members were required to
attend one in-person interview, or
• T2: multiple REA interviews group—members were required
to attend more than one in-person interview.
Using UI administrative data and follow-up interview data, the 
study results indicated that the T1 group (single REA) did not have a 
significant impact on most UI-related outcomes (e.g., weeks claimed 
and weeks compensated). Nonetheless, the T1 group did exhibit a 
reduction in the likelihood of overpayment by 3.5 percentage points. 
This statistically significant result is similar to the reduction in the like-
lihood of overpayments for T2 (3.8 percentage points). Since the T1 
and T2 groups received the same REA letter, this result suggests that 
the letter itself may have had an impact on reducing overpayments. 
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For the T2 group (multiple REAs), unlike the T1 group, REA 
services did have statistically significant impacts on UI-related out-
comes. Specifically, regression-adjusted impact estimates indicate 
that multiple REAs significantly reduce the following:
• the number of weeks claimed (0.9 weeks)
• the number of weeks claimed and compensated (1.2 weeks)
• the likelihood of exhausting UI benefits (3.7 percentage
points)
• the likelihood of having an overpayment (3.8 percentage
points)
The REA Initiative in North Dakota was implemented in five 
One-Stop Career Centers. Since non-job-attached UI claimants were 
already required to participate in eligibility reviews and to receive 
reemployment services, the introduction of REA did not dramatically 
alter existing services. Using UI administrative data and follow-up 
interview data, the study found no statistically significant impact of 
REA. These results are not surprising, since control group members 
in North Dakota received similar, but less intensive, services than 
treatment group members. The lack of statistically significant impacts 
may also be due to the limited size of the North Dakota sample.
FOUR-STATE EVALUATION OF THE REA INITIATIVE
In 2008, USDOL asked IMPAQ to assess REA program impacts 
during the period from July 2009 to December 2009. The study 
included process and impact analyses of REA programs in four states: 
Florida, Idaho, Illinois, and Nevada (Poe-Yamagata et al. 2011). The 
process analysis revealed the following results: 
• All states conducted in-person interviews as required by their
REA grants.
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• All states referred to adjudication those claimants who did not
participate in the REA interview.
• All states reported the data on their REA implementation to
USDOL; however, states had difficulty in meeting the require-
ment to report REA program impacts.
• States differed in staff assignment to REA. Some REA inter-
viewers devoted 100 percent of their time to REA; other in-
terviewers spent only a portion of their time on REA and the
remainder on other activities.
• States differed in determining REA eligibility. Some selected
claimants for REA services based on their likelihood of ex-
hausting UI benefits. Others selected only those with work
experience in a high-demand occupation.
• In some states, REA interviews were conducted as early as
four weeks after the initial claim-filing date, and in other
states as late as eight weeks.
• Rescheduling of REA appointments was generally permitted;
however, there was substantial variation in how many times a
claimant could reschedule.
• In most states, REA interviewers referred claimants to reem-
ployment services and training. In Nevada, the REA program
and the RES program were fully integrated.
The impact evaluation addressed the following key research 
questions:
• Did REA lead to a reduction in benefit exhaustion, UI claim
duration, and total UI benefits?
• Did REA lead to savings for the UI Trust Fund?
• Did REA lead to savings after deducting REA program costs?
• Was REA effective in assisting UI recipients to become
reemployed?
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States were required to randomly assign UI claimants into either 
a treatment group or a control group to evaluate the effectiveness of 
the REA Initiative. Treatment group members were required to partic-
ipate in REA services; control group members were not required to do 
so. While the random-assignment process differed somewhat across 
the study states, the four states selected for this study all had rigorous 
random-assignment designs that yielded treatment and control groups 
that were similar on all characteristics. The impact results in each of 
the four study states follow.
Florida Impact Results
• REA led to significant reductions in the duration of receiving
regular UI and extended unemployment compensation (EUC)
benefits. On average, REA claimants received 1.74 fewer
weeks of benefits compared to the control group.
• REA participants experienced a significant reduction (3.4 per-
centage points) in the likelihood of exhausting regular benefits
and a significant reduction (3.3 percentage points) in the like-
lihood of receiving EUC benefits.
• The REA program, on average, reduced total regular UI ben-
efits by $101 and extended benefit payments by $294. Com-
bining the reductions in regular UI benefits and extended ben-
efits, REA reduced total benefits by $395, on average.
• The combined $395 reduction in benefit amounts received per
treatment group member greatly exceeded the estimated $54
cost per treatment group member.1
• REA had positive impacts on reemployment outcomes, as es-
timated by earnings in the four quarters following the start
of the UI claim. REA treatment group members had higher
wages ($476 more) than their control group peers in the four
quarters following the start of their UI claim.
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Idaho Impact Results
• REA led to a significant reduction in the duration of receiv-
ing regular UI and EUC benefits. On average, REA claimants
received 1.14 fewer weeks of benefits than the control group.
• REA participants experienced a significant reduction (3.2 per-
centage points) in the likelihood of exhausting regular benefits
and a significant reduction (3.1 percentage points) in the like-
lihood of receiving extended benefits.
• REA reduced total benefit amounts received by $262 per REA 
participant. On average, REA participants received $97 less
in regular UI benefits and $165 less in extended benefits than
control group members.
• In Idaho, all treatment group members received an REA letter.
The letter required participants to complete an online REA
questionnaire. The average cost per REA participant was $12.
Those who did not complete the questionnaire were referred
to adjudication. Among those who did complete the question-
naire, a random sample were invited to participate in an in-
person REA interview.
• Inasmuch as the per-claimant savings of the REA program
amounted to $262, the savings substantially exceeded the cost
per treatment group member.
Illinois Impact Results
There is no evidence that the Illinois REA program led to changes 
in the duration of receiving regular UI or extended benefits, in the 
likelihood of regular UI benefit exhaustion or receipt of extended 
benefits, or in the amount of benefit receipt.
The lack of significant impact findings in Illinois may be attrib-
uted to several factors: 
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• There was a lack of consistency in the implementation of the
program:
 - the REA program was suspended in December 2008, and
 - the REA program was restarted in June 2009 (just prior to
the start of the study period). 
• Both groups had a small sample size (only 2,175 in the treat-
ment group, and only 937 in the control group).
• The REA program design targeted claimants with high- 
demand skills, thus restricting the population eligible for REA 
selection.
Nevada Impact Results
REA led to significant reductions in the duration of UI benefits. 
On average, REA claimants received 2.96 fewer weeks of benefits 
compared to their control group peers. 
REA participants experienced a significant reduction (10.4 per-
centage points) in the likelihood of exhausting regular benefits and 
a significant reduction (9.0 percentage points) in the likelihood of 
receiving extended benefits. 
On average, REA reduced total benefit amounts received by $805. 
REA participants received, on average, $526 less in regular UI ben-
efits and $279 less in extended benefits than control group members. 
The average cost per REA participant was $53. However, since 
REA and RES services and funding were so closely integrated, we 
combined the average costs of providing the integrated REA and 
RES. The estimated combined cost was $201 per REA treatment 
group member. The reduction in total benefit amounts received was 
$805 per treatment group member, which greatly exceeds the com-
bined REA and RES costs. 
The results of this analysis of REA program impacts indicate 
that the REA program was effective in assisting claimants in Florida, 
Idaho, and Nevada to exit the UI program and avoid exhausting regu-
76   Benus
lar UI benefits. There was no impact in Illinois; however, the Illinois 
REA program suffered from inconsistent implementation, small sam-
ple size, and restricting the program to claimants with high-demand 
skills. 
By enabling claimants to avoid UI benefit exhaustion, the pro-
gram led to reductions in the likelihood of their receiving EUC ben-
efits. The combined impacts of reducing program exhaustion and 
reducing receipt of EUC benefits led to significantly shorter UI dura-
tions and lower benefit amounts. Furthermore, the reductions in ben-
efits substantially exceeded the per-participant REA cost in the states. 
These results provide strong evidence that the REA program is a cost-
effective program. 
A key finding of our analysis is that there were substantially larger 
impacts in Nevada than in the other study states. While other states 
referred many REA participants to reemployment services, Nevada 
provided reemployment services to REA treatment group members in 
conjunction with the REA interview. It appears likely that Nevada’s 
combination of REA services with RES led to the greater program 
impacts. 
Based on the results of this analysis, we conclude that the REA 
program is an effective strategy for facilitating the exit of UI claim-
ants from the UI program and for producing savings. Furthermore, 
the results suggest that combining REA services with RES into a 
seamless delivery system may achieve greater impacts than providing 
REA services alone. 
EVALUATION OF THE NEVADA REA INITIATIVE
The 2011 evaluation of the impact of REA found evidence that 
the REA program was effective at achieving the program’s goals of 
reducing UI duration and generating savings to the UI Trust Fund. 
An important finding of this study was that the Nevada REA program 
was more effective at reducing claimant UI duration and generating 
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greater savings for the UI Trust Fund than the REA programs in the 
other states examined. The implementation of Nevada’s REA pro-
gram differed from the implementation in other states. In Nevada, 
the same staff provided both REA and RES.2 In the other three study 
states, different staff administered REA and RES. It appears that pro-
viding REA and RES by the same staff in a single integrated session 
may be a key factor that led to greater program impacts in Nevada. 
In light of these findings, USDOL asked IMPAQ to extend the 
study of the Nevada REA program using updated data on UI receipt 
and wages for REA-eligible claimants who entered the program from 
July through December of 2009. This follow-up study (Michaelides 
et al. 2012) used Nevada’s administrative UI data and intrastate wage 
records for all REA-eligible UI claimants who entered the program 
during this six-month period. These sources provided the following 
data: 
• UI receipt from program entry through September 2011
• quarterly wages earned in the six calendar quarters after pro-
gram entry
Using these data, the evaluation assessed the impact of the 
Nevada REA program on claimant UI receipt and quarterly wage out-
comes following program entry. The analysis found that the Nevada 
REA program was effective at assisting claimants to exit the UI pro-
gram sooner than they would have in the absence of the program, 
leading to lower UI duration and producing important savings for the 
UI Trust Fund. The analysis also found that the program was effec-
tive in helping claimants find employment in the period following 
program entry. Based on these results, the researchers concluded that 
the Nevada REA program is an effective policy tool for reducing UI 
duration and assisting UI claimants to return to productive employ-
ment more rapidly than they would in the absence of the program. 
The Nevada study extends the earlier study of the Nevada REA 
program using updated data on UI receipt and wages for REA- 
eligible claimants who entered the UI program from July through 
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December of 2009. During this period, Nevada randomly assigned 
about 15 percent of REA-eligible claimants to the treatment group. 
These claimants were required to receive REA services and reem-
ployment services to remain eligible for UI benefits. The remaining 
85 percent of REA-eligible claimants were assigned to the control 
group and were not required to receive any services. 
Results of the analysis from the earlier study, like the later one, 
showed that the Nevada REA program was effective in helping 
claimants to exit the UI program sooner. The analysis also shows that 
claimants in the REA treatment group were significantly less likely 
than those in the control group to exhaust regular UI benefits and start 
receiving extended benefits. Thus, the Nevada REA program led to 
significantly shorter UI durations and lower benefit amounts—REA 
treatment group claimants collected 3.13 fewer weeks and $873 less 
in total benefit amounts than their peers. These savings exceeded 
average program costs by more than four times, providing strong evi-
dence that the Nevada REA program is a cost-effective intervention. 
The impact analyses also show that the Nevada REA program was 
effective in assisting claimants to obtain employment in the first two 
quarters following program entry. Furthermore, these impacts were 
sustained through six quarters following program entry. Because of 
these impacts, REA treatment group members returned to employ-
ment faster than their peers, which led to their earning higher total 
wages following program entry. These results suggest that, in addi-
tion to assisting claimants in exiting UI early, REA helped claimants 
to obtain employment earlier than they would have in the absence of 
the program. 
Overall, these impact analyses provide strong evidence that the 
Nevada REA program is an effective strategy for facilitating the exit 
of UI claimants from the UI program and producing savings for the 
UI Trust Fund. It is also evident that the program is effective in facili-
tating the reemployment of UI claimants. Based on these results, the 
authors concluded that Nevada’s system of combining REA services 
with RES into a seamless delivery system is an effective mechanism 
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for reducing UI duration and for assisting claimants to return to pro-
ductive employment.
While the Nevada results indicate that combining REA with RES 
is highly effective in returning unemployed workers to employment, 
it would be of interest to determine the relative importance of REA 
and RES. To isolate the effect of REA and RES, one would need to 
develop a random-assignment study where eligible claimants would 
be assigned to different combinations of REA and RES. 
EVOLUTION OF REA INTO RESEA
Based on the strong Nevada findings, USDOL has recently pro-
posed significant increases in program funding as well as dramatic 
changes to the design of the UI REA program. One indication of 
the changes that are taking place is the change in program name. In 
2015, USDOL changed the name of the program from Reemploy-
ment and Eligibility Assessment (REA) to Reemployment Services 
and Eligibility Assessment (RESEA). This name change reinforces 
the increasing emphasis of the program on reemployment services. 
The program name change, together with a proposed increase of 
$100 million in funding (to $180.9 million), is expected to have dra-
matic impacts on future operations of the program. Funding for the 
program has grown dramatically since its inception in 2005. 
As program services and the target population are expanded 
under the RESEA program, funding will likely continue to grow in 
future years. For example, the new RESEA funds may be used to pro-
vide reemployment services to program participants; previously, UI 
REA program funds could be used only for referrals to reemployment 
services. Furthermore, the target population for the RESEA program 
includes both UI claimants who are identified as likely to exhaust 
benefits and in need of reemployment services and claimants receiv-
ing unemployment compensation for ex–service members. Thus, a 
portion of the RESEA funds will be used to provide reemployment 
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services to all recently separated military personnel receiving ex- 
service-member benefits.
With these proposed changes, REA and RES will no longer be 
disconnected; rather, they will be closely integrated into a single pro-
gram. USDOL’s budget justification for an increased budget of $100 
million and for combining REA and RES into a single RESEA pro-
gram is based largely on the successful model established in Nevada 
(USDOL 2016). In fact, the features of the new RESEA program are 
similar to the Nevada program: 
• in-person interviews to review eligibility for UI benefits
• provision of labor market and career information to claimants
to inform their career choices
• support for the development of a reemployment and work
search plan
• orientation to services available through American Job Centers
• provision of staff-assisted reemployment services, including
skills assessment, career counseling, job matching and refer-
rals, job search assistance workshops, and referrals to train-
ing, as appropriate
CONCLUSION
The development of the REA program owes a great deal to prior 
studies on the effectiveness of four aspects: 1) job search assistance, 
2) work search requirements, 3) reemployment services, and 4) the
combination of work search and employment services. Findings from
this research led USDOL to develop the basic parameters of the REA 
Initiative.
Since its introduction in 2005, the REA Initiative has evolved 
dramatically—from a small experimental program that covered only 
a few states to a large program that covers nearly all states. Moreover, 
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the focus of the program has changed. In its early years, it focused on 
identifying fraud and abuse, reducing UI benefit duration, and gen-
erating savings for the UI Trust Fund. In more recent years, USDOL 
has shifted the emphasis and encouraged states to provide additional 
reemployment services, including skills assessments, career counsel-
ing, job matching and referrals, job search assistance workshops, and 
referrals to training, as appropriate. 
This evolution of the REA program may be attributed, at least 
partly, to the research findings of several REA evaluations. In par-
ticular, the positive impacts found in the evaluation of the Nevada 
REA program led to a dramatic shift in program design to integrate 
reemployment services with the early focus on eligibility assessment. 
The evolution of the REA program could not have occurred without 
the ongoing support of USDOL for evaluating the impacts of the pro-
gram and for identifying the underlying mechanism that generated 
these impacts. 
The experiences of the REA Initiative can inform future USDOL 
programs designed to assist unemployed workers in returning to 
work. For example, providing states with implementation flexibility 
can be very beneficial. In the REA Initiative, grantees were given 
wide latitude in designing their state’s program. This variation across 
states provided researchers with a rich array of program designs to 
compare. One of these designs (Nevada’s) proved to be highly effec-
tive and therefore a candidate for emulation in other states.
Another lesson learned from the experiences of the REA Initia-
tive is that most states do not have the skills or resources needed to 
conduct a rigorous impact evaluation, as is mentioned in the Eberts 
chapter of this volume. To enable them to do so, USDOL should 
engage outside technical assistance to ensure that random assignment 
is conducted accurately and that program effectiveness is measured 
rigorously. 
Thus, the basic lesson learned from the REA study is that states 
are often in the best position to design programs that work best in 
their environment. At the same time, states often do not have the skills 
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or resources to rigorously measure program effectiveness without sig-
nificant outside expertise.
Notes
1. The average cost per treatment group member is derived by dividing the
state’s grant amount by the number of REAs conducted in the state.
2. The Nevada REA approach is similar to a 1970s experiment funded and
implemented by the Nevada state workforce agency, but there is no evi-
dence that the Nevada staff implementing the REA experiment were
aware of the earlier Nevada experiment.
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Incentive Experiments in 
Unemployment Insurance
Christopher J. O’Leary
W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research
Unemployment insurance was established to provide partial tempo-
rary income replacement during periods of active job search by invol-
untarily unemployed labor force members. The program has achieved 
that objective faithfully since 1937. However, economic theory sug-
gests that paying unemployment insurance (UI) benefits may prolong 
joblessness, and econometric research has found evidence that UI 
work disincentives do exist. This led to a series of randomized con-
trolled trials to identify ways to overcome work disincentives while 
still paying UI. The experiments have assessed interventions on both 
sides of the job market. Job seeker trials have tested cash reemploy-
ment incentives in various ways: by monitoring active work search, 
by trying new types of job search assistance, by checking UI benefit 
eligibility, and by targeting assistance based on worker character-
istics. Employer trials have tested hiring incentive payments, self-
employment assistance, and ways to encourage work sharing. This 
chapter reviews the experimental evidence and considers it in the cur-
rent context of the federal-state UI system. 
POLICY BACKGROUND
Policies to support labor markets in the United States are mostly 
initiatives of the federal government. Historically, states have been 
reluctant to independently pursue public employment policy for fear 
of competitively disadvantaging resident industries with added costs. 
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Federal requirements and funding have allowed the states to address 
labor market problems with a diminished risk of job loss from inter-
state competition for jobs. 
The Wagner-Peyser Act of 1933 established the U.S. Employ-
ment Service (ES), and the Social Security Act of 1935 established 
the federal-state UI system. These New Deal programs are at the core 
of federal employment policy, and they have evolved over time, as 
was described in the previous chapter. Since the 1980s, the states have 
truly served as laboratories of democracy, testing promising policy 
improvements by running classical field experiments with random-
ized controlled trials on large samples of program-eligible persons. 
This chapter summarizes the lessons learned from UI experiments 
conducted in states over the past 35 years. To set the stage for this 
discussion, the next section briefly reviews the principles and pitfalls 
of evaluation with experiments that were discussed in greater depth in 
Chapter 2 of this book. The subsequent sections summarize evidence 
from experiments in the ES-UI context that have been done to identify 
ways to promote employment and conserve UI reserves. The conclud-
ing section of this chapter offers a summary and some comments on the 
relevance of lessons from these experiments for the UI system today. 
THE APPEAL OF FIELD EXPERIMENTS
Classically designed field experiments involving random-
ized controlled trials (RCTs) are the gold standard for estimating 
the impact of changes to public programs. If random assignment is 
achieved, modeling of behavior and complex econometric methods 
are not needed to obtain reliable program impact estimates.1 With 
large samples randomly assigned to treatment and control groups, 
observable and unobservable characteristics of the two groups should 
not differ on average, so any difference in outcomes can be attributed 
to the program change. Average program impacts can be measured as 
the simple difference between the means of the samples of program 
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participants and of control group members on outcomes of interest. 
Since this process is easy to understand, impact estimates computed 
in this way can be influential for public policy.2
Policy decisions about whether to continue, expand, reduce, or 
cancel government employment programs require estimates of the net 
benefits from government spending. Cost-benefit analysis requires 
measurement of net program impacts, and such evaluations are not 
without potential problems—even if the evaluation is done under the 
ideal conditions of a field experiment. The first potential pitfall threat-
ens the internal validity of the experiment. Such problems include 
errors in random assignment and changing experimental conditions. 
The first of these can lead to lack of balance in characteristics between 
treatment and control groups. The second means that the same trial 
was not successfully repeated in all cases. Even with internally valid 
randomization, problems can result from dropout bias (wherein a cus-
tomer assigned to an experimental treatment did not in fact receive 
the service) and substitution bias (wherein a control group member 
actually receives the treatment) (Heckman et al. 2000). 
The second group of challenges in field experiments concerns 
external validity—or the ability to transfer impact estimates from 
the evaluation context to the real-world policy context. Time horizon 
effects can occur when treatment subjects understand that an experi-
mental service is only temporary rather than permanent. Learning 
effects can take place within a community during the course of an 
evaluation, causing later enrollees to act differently than those enrolled 
around the time the experiment begins. Entry effects not observed 
during an evaluation can emerge when an appealing service becomes 
generally available to a population of potential customers, thereby 
increasing program take-up and system costs. Hawthorne effects 
are responses to treatments that are due not to the content of service 
but simply to special attention.3 Displacement effects, which may be 
the most critical external validity concern, occur when treatment- 
assigned subjects improve their outcomes at the expense of others in 
the community who are not part of the evaluation sample.4 
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As Zvi Griliches said, “If the data were perfect, collected from 
well-designed randomized experiments, there would be hardly room 
for a separate field of econometrics” (Orr 1999, p. 187). The follow-
ing review mentions few exceptions to the classical assumptions of 
experimental design and does not delve into any corrections that might 
have been done before reporting final program impact estimates. The 
focus here is on average program effects. That is, it focuses on the 
effect of treatment upon the treated, assuming good experimental 
designs were properly implemented. 
THEORY AND EVIDENCE ON INCENTIVES
Economic theory suggests several reasons why paying UI to 
unemployed workers might prolong joblessness. Feldstein (1974) 
argued that moral hazard caused by paying UI leads beneficiaries to 
exaggerate the involuntary nature of their joblessness so as to prolong 
unemployment. In a labor-leisure model of choice, UI benefits lower 
the opportunity cost of deferring reemployment to consume more lei-
sure (O’Leary 1998). In a search model of unemployment, UI raises 
the reservation wage for accepting a new job, thereby reducing the 
probability that an acceptable offer arrives in any period (Ehrenberg 
and Oaxaca 1976). Decker (1997) reviews the econometric literature 
on UI work disincentives and reports the range of published estimates 
to be between 0.3 and 1.5 weeks’ longer duration of UI receipt for a 
10 percentage point increase in the UI replacement rate. 
REEMPLOYMENT BONUS EXPERIMENTS
A series of field experiments were conducted to evaluate positive 
reemployment incentives in UI. Between 1984 and 1989, four reem-
ployment bonus experiments targeted at UI recipients were conducted 
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in the United States. These experiments provided various levels of 
lump-sum payments to UI recipients who took new, full-time jobs 
within 6 to 12 weeks of their benefit application and held those jobs 
for at least three to four months. 
The aim was to measure the behavioral response of UI recipi-
ents to changes in the timing of benefit payments. The main outcome 
of interest was to speed return to work in a way that would benefit 
employees, employers, and the government, and would be cost effec-
tive. UI claimants would be better off if they returned to work sooner 
and found jobs that were similar and paid similar wages to the jobs 
that they would take in the absence of a bonus offer. Employers would 
be better off if they had lower UI payroll taxes. The government 
would be better off if the cost of the bonus were offset by a decrease 
in UI benefit payments to unemployed workers and an increase in 
income and other tax contributions by workers during their longer 
period of employment. 
Illinois UI Incentive Experiment
The first bonus experiment was conducted in Illinois during 
1984–1985 by the Upjohn Institute and sponsored by the Illinois 
Department of Employment Security. The design provided a $500 
bonus—equal to about four weeks of UI benefits—for reemployment 
within 11 weeks of applying for benefits if the job was held for four 
months. The bonus offer was estimated to reduce UI receipt by 1.15 
weeks (Woodbury and Spiegelman 1987). Participants suffered no 
decline in job quality, as reemployment wages did not differ from 
the prior job, but the estimated cost savings led to a large benefit-cost 
ratio of 2.32.
New Jersey UI Reemployment Experiment
The U.S. Department of Labor sponsored a New Jersey UI exper-
iment in 1985–1986 that included a reemployment bonus, among 
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other features. The initial bonus offer was one half of the claimant’s 
remaining entitlement at the time of the offer, and it remained con-
stant for the first two full weeks. After that, the bonus offer declined 
by 10 percent of the original amount each week, falling to zero by the 
end of the eleventh full week of the bonus offer. Initial bonus offers in 
New Jersey averaged $1,644, or about nine times the UI weekly ben-
efit amount (Corson et al. 1989). The bonus was estimated to shorten 
UI durations by about half a week and generated only modest savings 
in UI. 
Pennsylvania and Washington Reemployment 
Bonus Experiments
In 1987, the Pennsylvania and Washington experiments were 
designed to test varying bonus offers and search periods. The result-
ing designs included four treatment groups in Pennsylvania and six 
in Washington. Each treatment specified a bonus level (high and low 
in Pennsylvania; high, medium, and low in Washington) and a quali-
fication period or duration of the bonus offer (short and long in both 
states). The reemployment period of four months was the same for all 
treatments. Impact estimates on weeks of UI benefits received ranged 
from −0.04 to −0.84, with a mean effect across the 10 treatments in 
Pennsylvania and Washington of −0.51 weeks (Decker and O’Leary 
1995). The mean estimated savings to the UI program came to $25 
per offer. 
Targeting Reemployment Bonuses
O’Leary, Decker, and Wandner (2005) investigated whether tar-
geting reemployment bonus offers to unemployment insurance (UI) 
claimants identified as most likely to exhaust benefits would reduce 
benefit payments.5 They showed that targeting bonus offers with pro-
filing models similar to those in state Worker Profiling and Reem-
ployment Services (WPRS) systems can improve cost effectiveness.6 
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However, estimated average benefit payments do not steadily decline, 
as the eligibility screen for targeting is gradually tightened by the 
probability of UI exhaustion. They find that narrow targeting is not 
optimal. The best candidate to emerge is a low bonus amount with 
a long qualification period, targeted to the half of profiled claimants 
most likely to exhaust their UI benefit entitlement. 
Interpreting Results from the Bonus Experiments
The relatively weak response to the bonus offers in New Jer-
sey, Pennsylvania, and Washington led to a reexamination of the 
very large Illinois results. It was discovered that within the designed 
Illinois experiment, a second experiment had unintentionally taken 
place. In 1984, as Illinois was recovering from a major recession, 
the availability of Federal Supplemental Compensation (FSC) was 
terminated. This resulted in about half of the claimants studied having 
38 weeks of UI benefit eligibility, with the remainder being eligible 
for only 26 weeks of regular UI benefits. It turns out that the mean 
bonus response of −1.15 weeks in Illinois was made up of a response 
of −1.78 weeks for those eligible for FSC and −0.54 weeks for those 
not eligible (Davidson and Woodbury 1991). The mean response of 
−0.54 for the non-FSC sample in Illinois is close to the responses
observed in New Jersey, Pennsylvania, and Washington, where the
entitled durations of benefits were comparable.
Analysis of treatment impacts by characteristics of participants, 
industries, and labor markets showed that the reemployment bonus 
had a remarkably even impact on various subgroups of workers, 
whether delineated by gender, age, race, industrial sector of employ-
ment, level of local unemployment, or level of the weekly benefit 
amount. The effects of bonus offers did not differ significantly across 
these important distinctions, suggesting that the bonus offer could be 
an equitable way to improve program efficiency. 
Two potential behavioral effects might reduce cost effectiveness 
for an operational program (Meyer 1995). First, an actual bonus pro-
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gram could have a displacement effect. Displacement occurs if UI 
claimants who are offered a bonus increase their rate of reemploy-
ment at the expense of other job seekers not offered a bonus. Second, 
there is also the risk that an operational bonus offer program could 
induce an entry effect. That is, the availability of a reemployment 
bonus might result in a larger proportion of unemployed job seekers 
entering the UI system. 
If entry and displacement effects are large, actual program cost 
effectiveness will be smaller. However, targeting offers of a low 
bonus amount coupled with a long qualification period to only those 
most likely to exhaust UI could reduce both these risks. Targeting 
would introduce uncertainty that a bonus offer would be forthcom-
ing upon filing a UI claim, which should reduce the chance of a large 
entry effect. Also, targeting should reduce any potential for displace-
ment, since a smaller proportion of claimants would receive the bonus 
offer.7 
THE UI WORK TEST AND JOB SEARCH 
ASSISTANCE EXPERIMENTS
Unemployment insurance provides temporary partial wage 
replacement to the involuntarily unemployed. Proper administration 
of this objective assures that UI is social insurance and not a dole. 
Eligibility rules require that UI beneficiaries are strongly attached to 
the labor force and temporarily jobless through no fault of their own. 
To initially qualify for UI, a claimant must satisfy both monetary and 
nonmonetary eligibility requirements. Monetary eligibility for UI is 
determined by base period earnings.8 Nonmonetary eligibility rules 
specify that the job separation must be involuntary. These rules pro-
hibit quits and discharge for causes justifiable by an employer, such 
as unexplained absences or misconduct. To maintain continuing UI 
eligibility, beneficiaries also must be able, available, and actively 
seeking full-time work. Assessment of compliance with the UI work 
Incentive Experiments in Unemployment Insurance   93
test is normally administered by the ES, which works in cooperation 
with state UI agencies. An influential audit of UI payment accuracy 
done for the U.S. Department of Labor reported that a large number 
of overpayments in the UI system were due to failure to satisfy work 
search requirements (Burgess and Kingston 1987). This important 
study spawned a series of evaluations of the UI work test and associ-
ated job search requirements.
The UI work test normally involves beneficiaries certifying on 
their biweekly continued claim form that they have actively searched 
for work. Most states require beneficiaries to name two or three spe-
cific employers contacted about work in the past two weeks. Job 
search assistance (JSA) comprises a bundle of services available 
from the public labor exchange, which may include résumé prepara-
tion assistance, job finding clubs, provision of labor market informa-
tion, development of a job search plan, and orientation to self-service 
resources like job vacancy listings, résumé preparation, word proces-
sor competency testing, and telephones for contacting employers. 
Evaluations of the UI work test and JSA have overlapped.
Four specific evaluations of JSA have been particularly influen-
tial in shaping public labor exchange policy. All four were done as 
field experiments involving random assignment. Among other offer-
ings of the public employment service, job referrals and placements 
have not applied an experimental design because of the unethical 
design requirement of withholding from the control group basic ser-
vices having universal entitlement. Consequently, JSA evaluations 
have focused on UI claimants and have usually involved providing 
additional services. 
Charleston Claimant Placement and Work Test Experiment
The first field experiment of the UI work test was done in 1983 
in Charleston, South Carolina (Corson, Long, and Nicholson 1985). 
Three treatments represented successively larger bundles of services. 
The control group was given the customary work test, which involved 
94   O’Leary
informing claimants that ES registration was required but involved 
no systematic monitoring of this requirement. The three treatments 
involved the following: 1) a strengthened work test, requiring ES 
registration before a second UI benefit check was paid; 2) added 
to the first treatment were enhanced placement services, a personal 
placement interview, a job referral or an outreach attempt to a pro-
spective employer, and training in using the job vacancy listings; 3) 
in addition to the second treatment, there were special workshops on 
job search and labor market information.
Impacts of the three treatments on UI weeks were −0.51, −0.61, 
and −0.76, respectively. Subgroup effects were largest for men (−1.0 
weeks) and workers in the construction industry (−4.0 weeks). The 
biggest marginal benefit came from the first treatment, which relinked 
ES with UI. Given the low cost per ES participant, all treatments were 
highly cost effective. The third treatment, which involved the largest 
number of components, had an average cost per participant of only 
$17.58 in 1983 dollars. 
Washington Alternative Work Search Experiment
An experiment in Tacoma, Washington, conducted between July 
1986 and August 1987 tested three differences from the standard work 
search requirement of three employer contacts per week: 1) elimina-
tion of the reporting requirement, 2) individualized stronger work 
search requirements plus a group eligibility review, and 3) Treatment 
2 plus required workshops and additional individual counseling and 
assistance.
Removing the work test increased UI benefit durations by 3.34 
weeks. Treatment 2 did not have a statistically significant effect, but 
Treatment 3 shortened UI durations by −0.47 weeks (Johnson and 
Klepinger 1994). An analysis of the timing of responses to the treat-
ments suggested that beneficiaries were more likely to stop UI receipt 
just before a scheduled intervention, rather than after the service was 
provided. Such a response might be termed an “invitation effect.” 
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This result raised the question of whether the response was due to the 
value of the services or the time burden of participation. 
Lachowska, Meral, and Woodbury (2015) examined long-term 
evidence from the Tacoma experiment by merging Washington UI 
program administrative data from nine additional years after the orig-
inal one-year follow-up period. They focused on the treatment that 
removed the work test, and they estimated that nearly all the costs 
were borne by the UI system in the year of the experimental pro-
gram change. Long-term effects averaged out to zero, but subgroup 
analysis by job separation reason yielded an important result for those 
permanently separated from jobs. For this group, the 10-year follow-
up suggested that the standard UI work search requirement yielded 
significantly faster reemployment and greater long-term employment 
stability. Those excused from the work test got reemployed about 
1.40 calendar quarters later and had job tenure of about 1.65 quarters 
shorter than the comparison group.
Maryland UI Work Search Experiment
Enrollment in the Maryland UI Work Search Experiment was 
conducted in six public labor-exchange offices around the state dur-
ing 1994 (Klepinger et al. 1998). The control group faced the stan-
dard work search requirement of reporting two employer contacts 
per week. The four treatments had the following requirements: 1) 
reporting of four weekly employer contacts, which did not have to 
be verified; 2) two weekly employer contacts, which did not have 
to be reported; 3) reporting of two weekly employer contacts, plus 
attending a four-day job search workshop; and 4) reporting of two 
weekly employer contacts—claimants were told contacts would be 
verified. The treatment impacts on weeks of UI benefits were as fol-
lows: −0.7, 0.4, −0.6, and −0.09. Notably, the impact of the fourth 
treatment occurred during the first spell of joblessness. Similarly, the 
first treatment generated the bulk of its response during the first spell 
of joblessness in the benefit year. The effects of Treatments 1, 3, and 
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4 were not associated with lower reemployment earnings. However, 
eliminating the work search reporting requirement, as in Treatment 2, 
raises reemployment earnings by a statistically significant 4 percent. 
A second control group facing the standard work test was also 
tracked, but claimants assigned to this group were told that their 
behavior was being tracked as part of an experiment. This was done to 
permit testing for the presence of a Hawthorne effect. This is relevant 
in ensuring external validity of the evaluation. If part of the treat-
ment response to a new work test is simply due to added attention on 
the work test, then such an effect could quickly dissipate after actual 
implementation. Impact estimates computed as a contrast between the 
participant group and each of the two control groups were virtually 
identical, suggesting the absence of any Hawthorne effect.9
Michigan Reemployment and Eligibility Assessment Nudge
Reemployment and Eligibility Assessments (REAs) involve 
repeated validation of all aspects of UI eligibility during the benefit 
year and providing additional reemployment services. In Chapter 4 of 
this book, Jacob Benus explains the policy development and evalu-
ation results for the REA. The most recent REA evaluation involved 
random trials in Nevada (Michaelides et al. 2012). The Nevada tri-
als provided evidence that for the REA, both the work test and the 
reemployment services were separately effective, which is valuable 
evidence in the face of the Tacoma results.
Michigan received a U.S. Department of Labor grant to deliver 
REA services in five workforce areas in 2015. The Michigan REA 
started on January 29, 2015, but only about half of REA-assigned 
beneficiaries were completing REA. The W.E. Upjohn Institute for 
Employment Research worked with Mathematica and Ideas42 on a 
small, randomized controlled trial evaluating a low-cost intervention 
to increase REA participation in the four-county workforce devel-
opment area overseen by Michigan Works! Southwest, a One-Stop 
agency administered by the Upjohn Institute. Random assignment 
began on March 16, 2015, and ended on September 30, 2015. 
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In the parlance of behavioral economics, the low-cost interven-
tions were “nudges” for participation (Babcock et al. 2012), as was 
discussed in Chapter 3. The nudges took the form of a series of e-mails 
providing information and reminders to participate in REA services. 
The nudges reminded REA beneficiaries about three required REA 
appointments. A follow-up set of three “persistence” e-mails were 
also sent to encourage and reinforce job search activity after the third 
REA visit to a Michigan Works! office. The persistence e-mails pro-
vided links to office locations and phone numbers, schedules of local 
services, and testimonials from previous service recipients.10 
The study found that “UI claimants who were sent email mes-
sages were more likely to start the REA program by scheduling their 
first session. UI claimants who received email messages were also 
more likely to complete the REA program. Once individuals attended 
their first REA session, they were equally likely to complete the pro-
gram regardless of whether they had received emails or not” (Darling 
et al. 2016, p. 1).
TARGETED JOB SEARCH ASSISTANCE
Targeting of JSA surfaced as a policy option during the 1990s, 
following the massive economic restructuring and worker disloca-
tion of the previous decade. The question of whether JSA would be 
effective for those at risk of long-term unemployment was evaluated 
in the New Jersey experiment (Corson et al. 1989). This provided 
essential evidence to support establishment of the WPRS system, 
which requires JSA early in the UI benefit year for those most likely 
to exhaust their UI entitlement (Wandner 1994). Two other experi-
ments evaluated the effectiveness of targeted JSA. The first was done 
around the time of WPRS start-up (Decker et al. 2000). The other 
was done in the context of the WPRS program operating in Kentucky 
(Black et al. 2003). 
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New Jersey UI Reemployment Experiment
The New Jersey UI Reemployment Experiment ran in 1986 and 
1987 (Corson et al. 1989). The sampling frame for random assign-
ment targeted the evaluation to dislocated workers claiming UI ben-
efits by requiring applicants to 
1) receive a first UI benefit within five weeks of application,
2) be at least 25 years old,
3) have worked for the pre-UI claim employer at least three
years,
4) not be on standby awaiting return to the claimant’s previous
job with a specific recall date, and
5) not be a union hiring hall member.
The three treatments were as follows: 1) JSA alone, 2) JSA plus
an offer of job training,11 and 3) JSA plus the cash reemployment 
bonus described above. During the benefit year, weeks of UI ben-
efit receipt declined by −0.47, −0.48, and −0.97 for the three treat-
ments, respectively. All of these impact estimates carried statistical 
significance. The cumulative impacts on weeks of UI benefit receipt 
over the six years after the initial benefit claim were −0.76, −0.93, 
and −1.72 for the three treatments, and the estimated impact from 
the third treatment was statistically significant (Corson and Haimson 
1996). The New Jersey UI Reemployment Experiment demonstrated 
that JSA targeted to claimants likely to be long-term unemployed had 
the same cost-effective impact as that found for other groups of UI 
claimants—about half a week shorter UI receipt. 
D.C. and Florida Job Search Assistance Experiment
In 1993, President Clinton signed Public Law 103-152, which
required states to establish and use a WPRS system to identify UI 
claimants most likely to exhaust their regular benefits and provide 
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them with early reemployment services. Under WPRS, UI recipients 
who are expecting recall or members of a union hall are dropped, 
because they are not expected to undertake an active independent job 
search. Then, remaining UI recipients are ranked by their likelihood 
of exhausting UI benefits. Referrals are then made to early reemploy-
ment services in the order of the profiling score until the capacity of 
local agencies to serve them is exhausted. 
The targeted JSA experiment done in Florida and Washing-
ton, D.C., in 1995 and 1996 applied what became a standard two-
step practice in nearly all states for WPRS: 1) exclude job-attached 
and union hiring hall members, then 2) evaluate the probability of 
exhausting UI entitlement and target those with the highest probabili-
ties for the evaluation. From this profiled sample frame, randomiza-
tion was done to the control group and the three treatments: 1) struc-
tured job search assistance orientation, testing, job search workshop, 
and a one-on-one assessment interview; 2) individualized job search 
assistance (IJSA) orientation, one-on-one assessment interview, and 
an individual employability plan; and 3) IJSA+, which is Treatment 2 
plus the possibility of job skill training (Decker et al. 2000). 
The statistically significant impacts on weeks of UI compen-
sation in the benefit year in Washington, D.C., were −1.13, −0.47, 
and −0.61, and in Florida they were −0.41, −0.59, and −0.52. There 
was no evidence of any pre/post wage change, but earnings did rise 
slightly in the District of Columbia. Structured JSA emerged as the 
most cost-effective intervention examined. 
Kentucky Targeted Reemployment Services
An independent assessment of WPRS in Kentucky based on an 
experimental design was done by economists at the Center for Busi-
ness and Economic Research at the University of Kentucky (Black et 
al. 2003). Kentucky divides the predicted UI exhaustion distribution 
into 20 ranges. Depending on the level of UI claims, weekly office 
capacity is reached within one of the 20 groups. Randomization is 
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done on the group margin at capacity—called the tie group. Based on 
data from 1994 to 1996, the impact estimates for WPRS in Kentucky 
were −2.2 weeks of UI, −$143 in UI benefits, and a $1,054 increase in 
earnings during the UI benefit year. The difference in these estimates 
from the national WPRS evaluation was most likely due to the fact 
that Black et al. essentially confined their contrasts within profiling tie 
groups, thereby achieving a closer counterfactual. The authors noted 
that the reduced duration was mainly due to no-shows for the profil-
ing services, but it may be the case that these UI beneficiaries simply 
returned to work earlier. 
The extraordinary foresight of the Kentucky Department of 
Employment Services to include randomization in assignment to 
WPRS should be a model for all state and local employment-service 
delivery agencies. In setting up WPRS administrative rules, the Ken-
tucky agency realized the value of evaluation research and used that 
orientation to help resolve the resource allocation problem. When 
resources are limited, randomization in program assignment can 
always be viewed as an equitable mechanism. It has the added benefit 
of providing for strong evaluation evidence. 
EMPLOYER INCENTIVES
Most public employment programs focus on the supply side of 
the labor market. Evaluations have also been done of interventions to 
increase labor demand. This section reviews field experiments done 
to induce hiring, self-employment, or job retention. 
Illinois UI Hiring Incentive Experiment
Another experiment tested an intervention that amounted to 
a wage subsidy that was not restricted to economically disadvan-
taged workers but may have stigmatized job seekers. Woodbury and 
Spiegelman (1987) report that for the Illinois Reemployment Bonus 
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Experiment, cash bonuses paid directly to persons who gain reem-
ployment have a powerful effect in reducing the duration of unem-
ployment, whereas if a cash payment for hiring a job seeker is made 
to employers, the effect is almost nil. Employers may be reluctant 
to hire workers who present a voucher for payment from the state 
because it signals that the worker may have “hidden” characteristics 
that hinder their finding employment without a state subsidy.
Most programs for the unemployed are either income-support or 
labor-supply enhancing; the wage subsidy is a labor-demand stimu-
lus. But apparently regardless of the form of delivery of the subsidy to 
employers, it has a stigmatizing effect on workers. An obvious alter-
native is the wage supplement, which is paid directly to workers. This 
type of program has even been recommended to help welfare recipi-
ents (who might face the most severe stigma) gain reemployment.12
Dayton Wage Subsidy Experiment
Not specifically in the context of UI, but germane to stimulat-
ing employer hiring, a targeted wage subsidy was operated as a field 
experiment with random trials in 1980–1981 by the U.S. Department 
of Labor in Dayton, Ohio. The evaluation involved two treatments: 
1) a hiring tax credit and 2) a lump-sum cash subsidy payment, plus
a control group of otherwise similar employers. Burtless (1985, p.
106) writes that “the results show conclusively that workers known to
be eligible for targeted wage subsidies were significantly less likely
to find jobs than were otherwise identical workers whose eligibility
for subsidies was not advertised.” Burtless (1985, p. 105) speculates
that “the vouchers had a stigmatizing effect and provided a screen-
ing device with which employers discriminated against economically
disadvantaged workers.”
Self-Employment Experiments
Self-employment programs for unemployed persons have been 
operating in Europe since 1979.13 Seventeen countries belong-
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ing to the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Develop-
ment have programs patterned after either the French model, which 
grants a lump sum payment, or the British model, which provides a 
series of periodic support payments during the start-up phase of self- 
employment.14 The British model amounts to a waiver of the work 
search requirements for continued receipt of periodic UI payments. 
American experiments tested the French model in Washington State 
and the British model in Massachusetts (Benus et al. 1995).
The Massachusetts self-employment experiment ran from 1990 
to 1993 and provided UI payments every two weeks for up to 30 
weeks. The treatment group increased self-employment, reduced the 
length of unemployment, increased earnings, and increased recipi-
ents’ total time in employment—including self-employment plus 
wage and salary employment. The treatment was cost effective for 
project participants, society as a whole, and the government sector 
as well. Total earnings of the average project participant increased by 
$5,940 over the amount earned by the average control-group member 
over the three-year follow-up period. 
The Washington UI Self-Employment and Enterprise Demon-
stration (SEED) enrolled UI beneficiaries from 1989 to 1990, with 
business services available for participants through March 1991. The 
SEED lump sum payment was the remainder of a UI beneficiary’s 
entitlement at the start of self-employment. Only about 4 percent of 
targeted Washington UI claimants met the initial eligibility require-
ments of attending an orientation and submitting an application. Com-
pared to the control group, treatments spent about four months more 
in self-employment, earned more from self-employment, spent about 
one month less in wage and salary employment, had higher rates of 
employment, reduced the length of the first unemployment spell, and 
had higher total UI payments during the benefit year (including the 
lump sum payment). 
The periodic payment model as tested in Massachusetts became 
a UI policy option for states to provide self-employment assistance 
(SEA) under the North American Free Trade Agreement in 1993. 
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In 1998, SEA became a permanent UI feature under the Workforce 
Investment Act of 1998. Eleven states quickly authorized SEA pro-
grams. Currently the program is actively used in Delaware, Missis-
sippi, New Hampshire, New York, and Oregon. 
Work Sharing Experiments
Work sharing under UI is commonly known as short-time com-
pensation (STC).15 Under STC, work reductions are shared among 
employees by reducing work hours instead of putting some workers on 
layoff. The STC program partially replaces lost earnings by paying a 
percentage of the full UI weekly benefit amount equal to the percent-
age reduction in weekly work hours. The STC program is not widely 
used. A field experiment was conducted in Iowa and Oregon in 2015 
and 2016 to test whether informational efforts could increase employer 
STC program awareness and program use (Houseman et al. 2017). 
In Iowa and in the Portland, Oregon, metropolitan area, research-
ers constructed stratified samples of all employers and randomly 
assigned them to treatment and control groups to test informational 
efforts sent by postal mail. In Oregon outside the Portland metro 
area, Oregon Worksource Regions were divided into “treatment” and 
“comparison” regions, and group informational sessions and region-
alized advertising efforts were made in addition to mailings.16 
Use of STC by Iowa employers did not change appreciably 
after the interventions began. However, the pattern of weekly STC 
payments in Iowa suggested that employers tried to take advantage 
of temporary federal payment of STC benefits, and results from 
employer surveys suggested a statistically significant increase in 
awareness about STC in the Iowa treatment group.17 In Oregon, there 
was also statistically significant evidence that informational efforts 
had a positive effect on employer awareness about STC. Furthermore, 
Oregon treatment employers started significantly more STC plans in 
both trials, with a 58 percent difference in the RCT and a 100 percent 
difference in the quasi-experimental design (Houseman et al. 2017).
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The experiments in Iowa and Oregon showed that informational 
outreach can increase employer use of STC. Currently, 28 states have 
STC plans, and in those states, STC is used relatively infrequently 
compared to regular UI (Balducchi 2015). If STC were available in 
all states, in recession periods STC could be used as a channel for fis-
cal policy by supplementing emergency federal extended unemploy-
ment benefits. 
SUMMARY AND RELEVANCE TO UI TODAY
As social insurance, UI partially replaces lost income for labor 
force members who are involuntarily separated from their jobs and 
actively seeking work. The program embodies elements of both pri-
vate insurance and social assistance. While benefit levels are related 
to prior earnings, they do not completely replace lost earnings but pay 
an amount that is directly related to prior wage levels up to a socially 
determined adequate weekly maximum. The elements most reflect-
ing private insurance principles involve testing initial and continuing 
eligibility for benefits by work search requirements. 
Research in the 1970s recognized the moral hazard risks of work 
disincentives resulting from paying UI benefits and estimated the 
effects to be between 0.5 and 1.5 weeks for a 10 percent increase in 
the wage replacement rate. This work led to a series of UI-related 
field experiments to identify improved administrative practices and 
incentives to control system costs and improve beneficiary outcomes. 
The reemployment bonus experiments in the 1980s estimated that 
offers would reduce UI durations by an average of 0.5 weeks and 
be modestly cost effective. Simulations based on the bonus experi-
ments found that a bonus amount smaller than the average, when 
targeted to the half of UI-eligible beneficiaries who are most likely 
to exhaust UI, achieved a 0.5-week reduction more cost effectively. 
Field experiments estimating the effects of strengthening work search 
requirements estimated UI duration reductions of between 0.5 and 1.0 
Incentive Experiments in Unemployment Insurance   105
week. An experiment removing the work test saw durations jump by 
3.3 weeks. The UI work test involves connecting the unemployed to 
job search assistance. Experimental evaluations of targeted job search 
assistance estimated UI durations to be shortened by between 0.5 and 
2.2 weeks. 
Field experiments evaluating hiring incentives offered to employ-
ers have generally not been found to be cost-effective policy options, 
mainly because of low employer take-up. However, some smaller UI 
programs show promise as labor demand policies—particularly when 
properly targeted. Field experiments that paid UI as self-employment 
assistance with a work search waiver during the business start-up 
phase, and targeted to those most likely to exhaust UI, were found 
to be cost neutral to the UI system and often led to second-order 
employment effects through hiring. Work sharing, or short-time com-
pensation (STC), which pays employees a fraction of their weekly UI 
equal to the proportionate reduction in work hours, can help employ-
ers control layoff costs and retain talent during business downturns. 
A recent field experiment suggests that employers will sometimes use 
STC instead of layoffs when they know how STC works.
The federal-state UI program is now gradually rebuilding system 
reserves after the Great Recession. Many states were left with bil-
lions in debt from paying regular benefits, even though the federal 
government fully paid for benefit extensions at unprecedented levels. 
Some states are retreating from accepted standards of UI adequacy 
with the expectation that the federal government will once again 
intervene when a new unemployment crisis emerges.18 However, after 
welfare reform, all social policy is now employment policy. Making 
and maintaining connections to the workforce is the only path to self-
sufficiency. Policymakers are looking for improvements to the public 
employment system that will be cost effective, or at least cost neutral. 
There is no silver bullet that will fix everything at once. The experi-
ments reviewed in this chapter offer a practical menu of choices to 
rebuild an employment security system that is a stronger part of the 
social safety net for all Americans.
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Notes
1. Heckman, Lalonde, and Smith (1999) enumerate the assumptions
implicit in such a view of random-assignment field experiments as a
means for model-free impact estimation.
2. When there is nonrandom assignment to either a program participant
group or the comparison group, proper estimation of program impacts
requires statistical methods of correction. See O’Leary (2017).
3. A Hawthorne effect is the initial improvement in a process of production
caused by the obtrusive observation of that process. The effect was first
noticed in the Hawthorne Works plant of the Western Electric Co. in
Cicero, Illinois, during studies of workplace behavior in the 1920s and
’30s. Production increased not as a result of actual changes in working
conditions introduced by the plant’s management but because manage-
ment demonstrated interest in such improvements. A reexamination of
the Hawthorne data has called into question whether such an effect actu-
ally occurred during the original studies (Jones 1992).
4. This discussion of impact estimation and most of the studies reviewed
here focus on partial equilibrium effects of interventions. That is, they
assume away external validity issues that include general equilibrium
effects such as entry and displacement effects. Some evaluations have
directly measured these effects (Davidson and Woodbury 1993).
5. Targeted reemployment bonuses were also tested in a field experiment
(Wandner 2012) as part of personal reemployment accounts (PRAs).
However, the design of the bonus offers under PRAs was not similar
to the earlier experiments, and the bonus take-up was low among UI
beneficiaries who accepted a PRA offer. Furthermore, across the seven
states where targeted PRAs were tried, only 45 percent of PRA money
was paid out in reemployment bonuses. An even larger share of PRA 
money was paid for supportive services (Kirby et al. 2008).
6. More on WPRS is in the section on targeted job search assistance.
7. Davidson and Woodbury (1993) estimate that a nontargeted bonus offer
to all UI claimants could increase unemployment durations among those 
not eligible for UI by between 0.2 and 0.4 weeks.
8. The UI base period is normally the first four of the previous five com-
pleted calendar quarters before the date of claim for benefits. For UI
claimants not eligible based on earnings in the standard base period,
earnings in an alternate base year—the four most recently completed
calendar quarters—are considered for monetary eligibility in 41 states.
9. A 1987 employment service reform in the United Kingdom called
“Restart” was evaluated by Dolton and O’Neill (1996, 2002). They
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found evidence that, over the short term, required JSA may appear to 
act as a stick, prodding UC beneficiaries back to work, but over the long 
term an earlier JSA intervention supports higher success in the labor 
market and higher earnings—evidence that JSA can have valuable con-
tent for job seekers.
 10. Only one recipient of a persistence nudge e-mail opted out of the
reminder and reinforcement service.
 11. Treatment 2 also had a relocation allowance, but it was rarely used.
 12. See for example Lerman (1985).
 13. Background information on the European experience with and the
American experiments in self-employment for unemployed persons can
be found in Wandner (1994).
 14. The French model is followed in Luxembourg, Norway, Portugal,
Spain, and Sweden; the British model in Australia, Belgium, Canada,
Denmark, Finland, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, and Germany.
 15. In Germany, where it is widely used, the program is known as kurzar-
beit, meaning “short-work.”
 16. Following Bloom (2000), the minimum detectable effect in the Oregon
quasi-experimental design (QED) evaluation will be larger than in the
RCT evaluation by a factor approximated by the square root of [1/(1 −
R2A)], where R2A is the coefficient of determination from the regression
of the QED treatment indicator on characteristics of employers in the
treatment and control samples.
 17. The Middle Class Tax Relief and Job Creation Act of 2012 relieved
STC employers of UI benefit charges by reimbursing states so employer
UI tax rates would not increase (O’Leary, forthcoming).
 18. The potential duration of regular UI benefits is no longer at least 26
weeks in all states.
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